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STATUTES AND DEMOCRATIC SELF-AUTHORSHIP

PAUL W. KAHN & KIEL BRENNAN-MARQUEZ*
ABSTRACT
In this Article, we argue that both sides of the usual debate over
statutory interpretation—text versus purpose—rest on a common, but
flawed, premise. Judges and scholars have assumed that legislative
bodies are the authors of statutes. We disagree; instead, we argue
that the people are the authors of statutes. Legislative bodies play an
indispensable role in the process: they draft statutes. And courts play
a similarly indispensable role: they interpret statutes. But ultimately,
it is the polity—we, the people—that is responsible, as authors, for
the content of the law.
This shift yields dramatic consequences. To date, no theory of
statutory interpretation has been able to explain the actual labor of
interpreting statutes—either with respect to “super” statutes or with
respect to regular statutes. Canons of statutory construction, though
familiar to any practitioner, are a source of puzzlement for theorists.
Our theory attempts to answer the challenge. It both offers an
explanation of existing interpretive practices and supplies a normatively compelling view of what statutory construction involves. In this
effort, we reach back to the origins of modern political theory—to the
work of Thomas Hobbes—to demonstrate that “self-authorship” has
long been integral to the ideal of democracy.
Ultimately, the problem is very simple. Commentators have long
been sympathetic to the notion of self-authorship as applied to
* Paul W. Kahn is the Robert W. Winner Professor of Law and the Humanities, Yale Law
School; Kiel Brennan-Marquez is a visiting fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law
School. For valuable conversations about the manuscript, we thank Bruce Ackerman and
Amnon Lev. Jacob Miller provided indispensable research assistance. Surviving errors are
our own.
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“fundamental” law—especially constitutional law. But they have
failed to notice that the exact same issues are at stake in the construction of “ordinary” laws. That is the connection we make here.
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INTRODUCTION
In a democracy, we ordinarily distinguish the making of law from
its application. The former, we think of as a task for the legislature,
whereas the latter is ultimately the responsibility of the judiciary.1
This separation of powers approach to law is legion in American
political theory, described first in The Federalist Papers and
endlessly repeated since.2 It mirrors the logic of “balanced forces”
characteristic of Newtonian physics: each branch asserts a force on
the others.3 The result is a harmonious political machine that runs
itself.
Trying to do legal theory today with this model of institutional
balance is like trying to do physics with the Newtonian system.
Stand back at the right distance—not too far and not too close—and
the distinction between making and applying law seems not only
plausible, but highly intuitive. Legislators author laws; courts apply
them. But closer inspection causes the Newtonian explanations to
break down. Take a few steps forward and the boundary between
creating and applying law begins to feather; a few more, and it
vanishes entirely.
This is the lesson of our decades-long debate over the nature of
interpretation—a debate that originated in constitutional theory but
subsequently spread to statutory construction.4 Some argue that it
1. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 163-64 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey

eds., 1994).
2. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47-51, at 234-55 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003)
(arguing for the merits of separating branches of government, with reference to political
theory and state constitutions, and explaining how the federal constitution embodies this
approach); see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (noting that the Constitution “enjoins upon its branches separateness but
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity”); Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of
Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 643-83 (2000) (pitting various theories of power separation
against one another—from within the Newtonian approach).
3. JASON ZIMBA, FORCE AND MOTION, at vii (2009).
4. For the classic exposition of this theme in the constitutional setting, see Robert H.
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1971)
(developing Wechsler’s concept of neutral principles through First Amendment jurisprudence);
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9-10
(1959) (arguing that judicial decisions should rely on neutral principles that transcend the
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is institutionally mandatory for judges to apply legal texts “as
written.”5 Others respond that no text interprets itself; absent
interpretation, there is nothing to apply.6 Debate has consolidated
around how “dynamic” statutory interpretation should be.7 In our
view, however, this debate has labored under common but deeply
flawed assumptions about authorship. Anxious to avoid the accusation of judicial aggrandizement, scholars on both sides of the
debate frame their theories as if the role of the courts is to be the
“faithful agents” of the author of the law: Congress.8 We reject this
model of legislative authorship root and branch. Legislators play an
indispensable role in statutory production: they draft statutes. And
courts, too, play an indispensable role in such production: they
case at hand). But see Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 793 (1983).
5. Harry W. Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of
Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1939).
6. See infra Part I.
7. For an excellent summary of existing positions, see Abbe R. Gluck, The States as
Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified
Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1761-64 (2010); see also Anthony D’Amato, The Injustice of
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 911, 912 (1996) (arguing that dynamic
statutory interpretation, by disrupting the predictability of law, unjustly subverts reliance
interests); William J. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479, 1479-81 (1987) (introducing and defending the notion of “dynamic” statutory
interpretation).
8. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 63 (1994) (laying out the normative stakes of the
“faithful agent” ideal); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001) (“In our constitutional system, it is widely assumed that federal
judges must act as Congress's faithful agents.”). Some have argued against the “faithful
agency” ideal on the grounds that it cannot account for more holistic methods of
interpretation. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist
Interpretation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1565, 1566-71 (2010) (distinguishing between
“faithful agent” theories of interpretation and “integrative” theories of interpretation). Merrill
argues that “sources of meaning for the integrative interpreter,” unlike sources of meaning
for the faithful agent interpreter, “include not only the text itself ... but also previous judicial
decisions construing the provision in question, previous administrative interpretations, other
enactments containing similar provisions, and even substantive canons of interpretation.” Id.
at 1569. The use of such sources, however, is completely compatible with the faithful agency
theory of interpretation. It simply requires a more robust notion of agency. See Guido
Calabresi, Being Honest About Honest Agents, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907, 910 (2010)
(arguing that the “agency” theory of statutory construction invites expansive interpretive
practices); William J. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 323
(1989) (noting that “a static view of interpretation does not rigorously follow from [the
premises]” of the faithful agent view); see also infra Part I.A.
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interpret statutes. Neither drafting nor interpreting, however, is the
same as authoring.
In a democracy, the people must see themselves as the authors of
the law. We must believe the law to be something we do together,
not something that is done to us. This is true not just of the
Constitution, authored by “We the People,” but of statutes as well.9
We are not democrats occasionally, as if collective authorship is a
phenomenon that occurs only in moments of political crisis. Rather,
collective construction—democratic self-authorship—is the legitimating condition of all law. Instead of imagining judges as the
“faithful agents” of legislators, the right model of statutory construction is one that understands both legislators and judges as faithful
agents of the people.10
Virtually all participants in the debate over statutory interpretation assume that authorship precedes interpretation. This is
backwards. Authoring is not the fact of drafting. It is a social
practice of attribution and accountability. Authorship is the
consequence of interpretation, not its precondition. In a democracy,
the best interpretation of a statute is one that persuades us to hold
ourselves accountable for the law as something that we the people
have authored together. Captured by the Newtonian image of
governmental forces, scholars have been quick to assume that
Congress authors statutes. They fear that the only alternative to
congressional authorship is judicial authorship—and that judicial
authorship would be an unconstitutional usurpation.
It is time to abandon the Newtonian imagery. Democracy, not
separation of powers, should be the lodestar of statutory construction. Congress does not rule us. We rule ourselves; we are the
9. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
10. Cf. William J. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 992 (2001) (“In my
view, Article III judges interpreting statutes are both agents carrying out directives laid down
by the legislature and partners in the enterprise of law elaboration, for they (like the
legislature) are ultimately agents of ‘We the People.’ ”). In referring to judges as agents of the
people, what Eskridge seems to have in mind is the judicial review function. Id. at 995 (“To
prevent injustices by the most dangerous branch [Congress], the least dangerous one—no less
an agent of ‘We the People’—was expected to strike down unconstitutional laws, trim back
unjust and partial statutes, and make legislation more coherent with fundamental law.”). This
is a familiar idea in constitutional theory. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS 6-13 (1991); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 5-7 (1998).
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authors of our own law. This is neither a fact nor a mere metaphor.
Rather, it is a necessary belief without which we are continually
forced to choose between the rule of law and self-rule. In interpreting a statute, the proper judicial role is to enable us to avoid this
choice, by sustaining belief in democratic self-authorship.
Our proposed relocation of authorship is directed less at practice
than at theory. Much of what courts actually do is more easily
explained by our theory of democratic self-authorship than by
traditional accounts of legislative authorship. Judges already share
an intuition of democratic legitimacy that our account theorizes. The
scholarly debate is another matter. Scholars have conflated democracy with electoral politics. In the traditional view, democracy, as
defined in electoral terms, must be saved from the courts. We turn
this over, arguing that democracy depends upon judicial interpretation. The role of courts is to explain the law as advancing a public
purpose that the people can imagine as their own. Absent such an
explanation, even a just law can seem as alien to us as the law of
another country.11
Contemporary democratic theorists have not entirely ignored the
idea of democratic self-authorship. But they have taken the idea in
a procedural direction, focusing first on voting and then on legislative process.12 Procedural constraints are certainly important. But
they are important less as a matter of democratic legitimacy than
as a matter of individual justice. Just as it is unjust to exclude
anyone from voting or speaking to the issues, it is unjust to privilege
certain interests in the legislative process. At the same time, merely
satisfying the demands of procedure will not ensure that the law
produced is seen as authored by the people. Even when legislative
bodies are functional and responsive, we are always governed in
substantial part by laws that we had no part in creating. Those
laws, too, must meet the democratic need to see ourselves as the
11. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 59-74 (2011) (stating that the
legitimacy of the American Constitution depends on it being accepted as “our law”); SANFORD
LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 54-89 (2d ed. 2011) (noting that interpreting the
Constitution such that it results in disjunction between constitutional and moral norms can
lead to a crisis of faith in the Constitution); Jamal Greene, Originalism’s Race Problem, 88
DENV. U. L. REV. 517 (2011) (discussing the ways that previously enacted laws—including the
Constitution—can come to feel as foreign as laws from other jurisdictions).
12. See infra Part IV.C.
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authors of the law by which we are governed. Otherwise, we are
governed by the dead hand of the past—hardly a democratic
principle.13 Only the courts can address this problem upon which the
legitimacy of the entire system rests. They must show us that the
law—old and new, constitutional and statutory—is something for
which we can hold ourselves accountable as authors.
Of course, democratic legitimacy cannot require that every citizen
approve of every law. Democracies are practical projects of governance, not utopian societies of discourse. The law is not what any
one of us would have done had we had sole responsibility. The law
is what we have collectively done together. Popular authorship of
law is not different in kind from other forms of collective enterprise.
Imagine a faculty member who disagrees with the decision to hire
a new colleague. He might express his view and vote against the
proposal. But if he loses, he will still accept the decision as something the faculty—including him—has done together. He will tell
others that this is “what we have done.” He will hold himself
accountable for that decision and defend it.
In this example, the fact of voting goes only to the mechanism of
the decision; it does not bear on the faculty member’s responsibility
to hold himself accountable for the decision’s content. Of course,
there are limits. If the faculty turns anti-Semitic or votes for the
dean’s nephew out of fear of retaliation, the individual faculty
member may refuse to accept authorship of the decision. In those
cases, he will call the decision illegitimate. Crucially, he will say
this even if he exercised a right to vote. Long after the votes have
13. Not surprisingly, a main effort of progressive constitutional theory has been to
emphasize the identity of the drafters—the fact that all the Framers were white, landed men.
This is supposed to operate as an argument against certain methods of reading the
Constitution—most prominently, originalism—because, as a pluralistic polity, we cannot
imagine ourselves into this role. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 11, at 518 (“Voting for delegates
to the state conventions largely excluded women, Indians, blacks, and those who did not own
property. The Constitution is as to those marginalized persons as the Zimbabwe Constitution
is to the rest of us, and so its authority must follow not from its democratic pedigree but from
some other, more inclusive account.”); Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
381, 381-87 (1997); Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States
Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth
Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 1032 (2002);
David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J.
1717, 1717-20 (2003). For a recent originalist response, see JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B.
RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 100-15 (2013).
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been cast, the faculty member must still account for the legitimacy
of the results. The same is true of democratic self-authorship in the
context of statutory construction. Legitimacy can be achieved only
through a deliberate practice of interpretation. In our system, that
responsibility falls to courts.
After surveying the state of the debates over statutory construction in Part I and drawing a schematic distinction between authors
and drafters in Part II, we then turn to the substantive defense of
our model. In Part III we look at the actual interpretive work of the
courts, arguing that despite their rhetoric of legislative authorship,
they are, for the most part, interpreting statutes in the way that
they should—that is, as faithful agents of the people. In Part IV, we
argue that self-authorship finds its normative roots in democratic
theory, particularly in the work of Thomas Hobbes.
I. WHERE THE DEBATE STANDS
Questions of statutory interpretation have drawn a remarkable
degree of scholarly attention over the last several decades. This is
all the more remarkable given how little energy had been invested
in the subject before—as if an entire generation of scholars suddenly
realized that the ordinary practice of applying the law was questionable and controversial.14 Everyone knew, of course, that statutes are
often less than clear. H.L.A. Hart famously wrote about how to
parse the word “vehicles” in a law prohibiting their entry in the
park.15 And courts grappled with the interpretive problem long
before Hart picked up his pen. As a discipline, however, “legislation”
is remarkably young.16
In the well-known case of Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, the Supreme Court declared that Congress did not mean
what it said when it prohibited entry of foreign laborers into the
country: “It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter
14. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 7, at 1479-80 (outlining the “traditional doctrine”
surrounding statutory interpretation, which made no conceptual space for anything besides
the intentions of the enacting body).
15. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,
607-11 (1958).
16. See Gluck, supra note 7, at 1761 (noting how the challenge issued by Hart and Sacks
developed to full fruition in only the last twenty years).
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of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its
spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.”17 The advent of the
statutory interpretation debates, however, gave the judicial practice
a broader frame of reference, suggesting that the legitimacy of the
entire constitutional order is at stake in how judges make sense of
ordinary laws. Exclude bicycles from the set of proscribed vehicles,
and judges become autocrats usurping the legislative role.18 Include
them, and legal interpretation becomes cramped and wooden:
unresponsive to real-world problems.19 Rhetoric became heated;
battle-lines were drawn; politicians paid attention; and judges lived
in fear that they would be accused of authoring, rather than
applying, the law.20
For all of their disagreement, nearly all participants in these
debates begin from the assumption that legislative will should
ground the interpretation of statutes.21 On this view, legislatures
are to make the substantive policy choices, and courts are to
implement those choices.22 The legislature is in control and the
judge is merely the legislature’s agent.23 Against this backdrop, the
debate has become methodological.24 The question that most
theorists have sought to answer—and upon which they disagree—is
how the judge can stay faithful to the legislative author of the
statute.25
A. Text and Purpose
The mainstream debate is divided in two factions, textualists and
purposivists, with a whole gamut of views in between.26 In fact, very
17. 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
18. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
19. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
20. See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 319-23 (outlining the contours and stakes of the
“legislation” debate from the early 1980s and onward).
21. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
22. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
23. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
24. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
25. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
26. For a summary of the various positions in the “interpretive wars,” see Jonathan R.
Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 123-30 (2009).
Some argue, for example, that legislative purpose may be referenced, and that materials such
as legislative history may be consulted—but only when the “plain meaning” is ambiguous. See
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few theorists reside at one extreme or the other.27 But our goal is not
to trace the full range of middle positions. Rather, it is to describe
the poles, in order to show how both are captured by a common idea
of legislative authorship in spite of their other differences.
On one side, the textualists argue that judges must stay within
the terms of the statutory text.28 They understand legislation to be
id. at 153-57; see also STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 88-92 (2010) (arguing
that extra-textual inquiry is necessary in light of the general-particular problems that
language always raises); Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 404-13 (2005)
[hereinafter Nelson, Textualism?] (arguing that self-styled textualists are often willing to
engage in “imaginative reconstruction” when plain text interpretation falters). Others argue
that inquiry into legislative purpose (and the corresponding use of materials such as
legislative history) is permissible for certain types of interpretation. For example, when
statutes are being reviewed for their constitutionality, many textualists are willing to broach
purposive questions. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (striking down a
facially neutral felony disenfranchisement because its purpose was to subordinate blacks);
Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1785-86 (2008)
[hereinafter Nelson, Judicial Review] (highlighting that courts willingly look behind statutory
text in order to ferret out “hidden purposes”).
At the same time, some commentators argue that the textualism-purposivism debate is
effectively over. Interestingly, however, they disagree about which way the debate has been
resolved. Compare Gluck, supra note 7, at 1764-68 (arguing that textualism has fallen out of
favor as a contending methodology on the statutory construction debates), with Jonathan T.
Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (arguing that
textualism has been “so successful” as to become the sole terrain in which serious debate now
takes place). Gluck argues that textualism suffers from “interpretive indeterminacy.” Gluck,
supra note 7, at 1764-68. Whereas purposivism is able to absorb all the virtues of
textualism—because a purposivist judge is free to engage in “textualist” interpretation, under
his own purposivism—textualists are forced to apply their method even when it makes little
sense. Id. at 1765. On the other hand, Molot argues that all major differences between
textualists and purposivists have effectively disappeared; textualism has subsumed opposing
schools, resulting in a spectrum of middle positions that are conceptually continuous and
practically flexible. Molot, supra, at 2-3; see also Frederick Liu, Astrue v. Ratliff and the Death
of Strong Purposivism, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 167, 167-68 (2011) (arguing that it is
purposivism, not textualism, which is dead letter on the Court today); Andrew Tutt, Fifty
Shades of Textualism, 29 J.L. & POL. 309, 309-10 (2013) (noting how porous, and also how
inclusive, the category of “textualism” has become).
27. See Nelson, Textualism?, supra note 26, at 383-86 (discussing widely operable canons
and practices of interpretation, and arguing that very few textualists are as strict in their
commitments as their opponents make them out to be); see also William J. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 322
(1990) (arguing against “foundationalist” approaches to statutory construction that reduce the
practice to discrete methodologies); Gluck, supra note 7, at 1765 (noting that self-styled
purposivists can, and often do, employ “textualist” methods of interpretation).
28. For illustrative defenses of the position, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997); Frank Easterbrook, Textualism and
the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1126 (1998).
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the result of multiple bargains among competing individuals.29 On
this view, to rely on anything apart from the text would be to
intervene retroactively in the legislative process of bargaining. The
risk, then, is that an unelected court will rewrite the bargain
reached by elected representatives. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
Court, captured the point: “Judicial reliance on legislative materials
like committee reports, which are not themselves subject to the
requirements of Article I, may give unrepresentative committee
members—or, worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists—[undue]
power.”30
Textualists understand statutes as akin to contracts subject to an
“integration” clause: background considerations fall away, and all
that remains is a bargain to be enforced.31 The text, in this view, is
the composite product of many factions and interest groups. Despite
the fact that legislators have voted for a single text, we have no
reason to think they have agreed upon a common purpose. Kenneth
Shepsle provides the most systematic defense of this position. In his
well-known article, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It,” Shepsle argues
that the collective nature of statutory creation renders the notion of
a unified “legislative intent” simply “oxymoronic.”32 In Shepsle’s
view, this insight leads unequivocally to the conclusion that strict
textualism—what he calls the “plain meaning” approach—is the
only valid method of statutory construction.33
An equivalent form of textualism can also stem from fear of
judicial overreach. Justice Scalia is the contemporary figurehead of
this position. His famously rigid brand of textualism is grounded in
his belief that judges, if they are allowed to negotiate between the
29. See SCALIA, supra note 28, at 25; Easterbrook, supra note 28, at 1119.
30. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (holding that
the supplemental jurisdiction statute will under certain circumstances permit a court to
exercise diversity jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs even if they do not satisfy the
minimum amount-in-controversy requirement).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981); 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON &
RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 33:23 (4th ed. 2012) (explaining
the effect of integration clauses in written contracts).
32. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron,
12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239, 249 (1992). Judge Posner refers to this—colorfully—as the
“autistic” theory of statutory meaning, because it “denies the possibility of meaningful
interpersonal communication.” RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 194 (2008).
33. Shepsle, supra note 32, at 253-54.
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text and other evidence of legislative intent, will inevitably read
their personal convictions into the law.34 For him, “[t]he best
evidence of [the purpose of a statute] is the statutory text adopted
by both Houses of Congress and submitted to the President.”35 The
force of this position does not depend on the proposition that the
statute’s plain text is literally all that we can know about what
Congress intended. Rather, the text must reign, because the
alternative is judicial authorship of the law—and that would violate
the principle of separation of powers.36
In the contemporary debate, the great opponents of textualism
are those who pursue “dynamic” statutory construction—often called
“purposivists.” Purposivists reject the view that the text alone
should serve as the guide to statutory construction.37 Just as some
textualists think the idea of an identifiable legislative purpose is a
fiction,38 purposivists think the idea that a text conveys a single
meaning is often a fiction.39 If legislative texts are ambiguous,
judges must decide among possible interpretations. That decision
must be based on some idea of the purpose of the statute. The
problem, accordingly, is to identify the non-textual sources to which

34. SCALIA, supra note 28, at 16-18.
35. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991) (holding that the Civil
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, does not permit the shifting of fees for
services rendered by experts).
36. See id.
37. Gluck, supra note 7, at 1764; see Liu, supra note 26, at 167.
38. Hence the familiar critique that drawing on legislative history—or any other
interpretive guide defined by equivalent multiplicity—is like “looking out over a crowd and
picking out your friends.” See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G.
Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 201 (2005). Of course, the critique can also be lodged in reverse. See,
e.g., William J. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 531, 533-34 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)) (“[B]ecause the regulatory terms that generate the
most intense statutory debates—such as ‘discriminate’ in civil rights laws—have a variety of
meanings, choosing one meaning of a word is ‘like entering a crowded cocktail party and
looking over the heads of the guests for one’s friends.’ ”).
39. See RICHARD POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 200-08, 214-15 (2012); Richard
Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 2012),
www.newrepublic.com/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-lawtextual-originalism [http://perma.cc/FDU8-MGSF]; see also Gluck, supra note 7, at 1764.
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a judge can appropriately turn when—dynamically—constructing
the purpose of a statute.40
In his pathbreaking work on dynamic interpretation, Bill
Eskridge argued that statutory construction is a “process of
understanding a text created in the past and applying it to a present
problem”—a process necessarily responsive to “the ways in which
the societal and legal environment of the statute has materially
changed over time.”41 Stephen Breyer and Richard Posner, the most
prominent advocates of dynamic interpretation among sitting judges
today, advance similar claims. Both describe their theories as
“pragmatic,”42 but the substantive similarity to dynamic interpretation is unmistakable. For both Breyer and Posner, pragmatic
interpretation focuses on goals and outcomes.43 In Breyer’s words,
when interpreting statutes, a judge’s goal should be to consider the
“likely consequences of a proposed interpretation” framed in terms
of “the provision’s purposes.”44 Breyer explicitly calls for judicial
discretion in the vindication of statutory purpose. Courts should
“help[ ] individual statutes work better for those whom Congress
intended to help,”45 even when—indeed, especially when—Congress
did not consider all possible parties who might solicit such “help.”46
Posner makes the same point in more biting language: legislators
40. One such source—and one corresponding view of dynamism—is how the meaning of
a given statute has grown up over time. In other words, it is possible to imagine approaching
statutory construction the same way that the common law approaches doctrine. See, e.g.,
Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 225, 233-35 (1999)
(exploring what it would mean for statutory interpretation to abandon the notion of fixed
meaning—at the time of passage—and take seriously the evolution of meaning over time).
This is importantly different from our account, which is explicitly normative in nature. While
there is certainly likely to be overlap between the way that statutory meaning has evolved,
on the one hand, and the set of constructions that makes a statute normatively relatable, on
the other, these are not necessarily the same set. Not least of all because a statute might be
more normatively relatable in more ways than its meaning has grown up over time. See infra
Part III.A. (outlining numerous, but equally relatable, meanings of Title VII).
41. Eskridge, supra note 7, at 1483.
42. Posner refers to his theory as “constrained pragmatism,” because the consequentialist
metric of pragmatism refers not to the outcomes that judges want, but rather to judges’
projections of the outcomes that legislators would want. POSNER, supra note 32, at 193-94,
230-69.
43. Id. at 193-94.
44. BREYER, supra note 26, at 92.
45. Id. at 96.
46. Id.
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“lack[ ] the gift of prevision,” which means they cannot be expected
to “anticipate [every] quirky case,” as well as “every future change
in society,” that might cause a statute’s letter and its spirit to
become dissonant.47
Purposivists begin from the common-sense belief that Congress
enacts statutes in order to address concrete problems. From this
premise, they infer that the interpretation of statutes should focus
on advancing solutions to the problems that the legislature has
addressed. In this vein, Eskridge analogizes the role of judges
interpreting statutes to that of “diplomats” who must be willing to
“update” their charges in response to “changing circumstances.”48
Breyer echoes this sentiment, arguing that statutory construction,
especially with respect to the “most complex statutes,” is best
understood as a process of “drafters, legislators, and judges
[working] together” to “carry[ ] out the legislators’ objectives.”49
Although these formulations envision a broad role for judges, the
purposivists, no less than the textualists, understand the judicial
role to be that of carrying out the legislative will; it is, after all, the
legislature’s purpose that is at issue.50 The dynamic theorists
expand the judicial role in statutory construction precisely to
vindicate the legislative will, which attempts to govern a complex
and ever-changing landscape.51

47. POSNER, supra note 32, at 198-99.
48. Eskridge, supra note 7, at 1482, 1554.
49. BREYER, supra note 26, at 97. Guido Calabresi has taken this position even further,
arguing that judges should be able to overturn and substantially transform “obsolete”
statutes—just as they would be able to do with common law rules. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2 (1982).
50. It bears note that this position—focusing on legislative purpose—is indeterminate as
to one of the most important questions of statutory construction today: how to approach
administrative rules. Breyer is deferential to agencies, see BREYER, supra note 26, at 110-13,
whereas Posner, from an equally pragmatic vantage point, is suspicious of them, see POSNER,
supra note 39, at 86, 123 (calling the notion that agencies have comparative expertise a
“fiction”).
51. For example, one theme that laces Eskridge’s work is concern about changing
circumstances, and the speed with which statutes become outdated with respect to the
problems they address. See Eskridge, supra note 7, at 1481; Eskridge, supra note 8, at 327-28
(outlining the role that “changed circumstances” ought to play in statutory construction). The
same sensibility is also at play in Breyer’s and Posner’s views. See BREYER, supra note 26, at
92-94; POSNER, supra note 32, at 13-15, 194-95, 201-02.
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B. An Example: Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons
A recent case illustrates the range of the contemporary debate,
while also making clear the common assumption that the judge is
to be the faithful agent of the legislative author. Ali v. Federal
Bureau of Prisons arose under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),
a statute that operates as a blanket waiver of sovereign immunity
and allows individuals to seek damages for the tortious acts of
federal officials.52 The petitioner in Ali spent two years in federal
prison in Georgia, at which point he was set to be transferred to a
different prison in Kentucky.53 Before the transfer, Mr. Ali inventoried two duffel bags worth of personal property to take with him to
Kentucky; upon arrival, however, numerous items were missing
from the bags, including “two copies of the Qur’an, a prayer rug, and
religious magazines.”54
Mr. Ali filed suit under § 1346(b) of the FTCA, which authorizes
suits for “injury or loss of property” caused by government officials.55
The difficulty arose from the fact that § 2680(c) carves out an
exemption for claims arising from “the detention of any goods,
merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or
any other law enforcement officer.”56 The question presented in Ali
was whether the government officials, named in Mr. Ali’s complaint,
qualified as “other law enforcement officer[s].”57
The Court divided sharply as to both the correct answer and the
proper method for addressing the question. Justice Thomas delivered the majority opinion, taking a firm textualist approach. “[R]ead
naturally,” he argued, “the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning”;58
Congress could hardly “have chosen a more all-encompassing phrase
than ‘any other law enforcement officer’ to express [its expansive]
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012) (“The United States [is] liable ... in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but [is not] liable for
interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages."); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S.
214, 218 (2008).
53. Ali, 552 U.S. at 216.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 218 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)).
56. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)).
57. Id. (alteration in original).
58. Id. at 219 (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)).

2014]

STATUTES AND DEMOCRATIC SELF-AUTHORSHIP

131

intent.”59 Nor is it relevant, Thomas noted, that a different construction of § 2680(c) might be “more desirable” from a policy
vantage point: “We are not at liberty to rewrite [a] statute ....
Instead, we must give effect to the text that Congress enacted.”60
Thus, on the majority’s view, the FTCA barred Mr. Ali’s suit.61
Justice Kennedy dissented, staking out a middle position on the
textualism-purposivism spectrum. Opening his opinion with the
declaration that “[s]tatutory interpretation, from beginning to end,
requires respect for the text,”62 Kennedy suggested that the majority
failed to “[consider] the text [of § 2680(c)] within the whole context
of the statute as a guide to determining a legislature’s intent.”63 In
particular, he argued that the majority should have applied widely
accepted canons of construction, especially ejusdem generis, to reach
a different result.64 Ejusdem generis teaches that “where a seemingly broad clause constitutes a residual phrase, it must be controlled by ... the ‘enumerated categories ... which are recited just
before it,’ so that the clause encompasses only objects similar in
nature.”65 Concretely, then, the clause “any other law enforcement
officer” should be read in light of the enumerated categories that
came before it—“officer[s] of custom or excise”—leading to the
conclusion that Congress only meant the exemption to apply to
“other law enforcement officers” that perform customs or excise
functions.66 Thus, on Kennedy’s view, Mr. Ali should have been
allowed to proceed with his claim against the prison officials.67
Although most of Justice Kennedy’s dissent crafted narrow
textual arguments, toward the end, the analysis shaded into purposivism. For Kennedy, the majority’s broad construction of § 2680(c)
effectively “defeat[ed] the central purpose” of the FTCA, which,
according to a Senate Report, was precisely to “make the tort
59. Id. at 221 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)).
60. Id. at 228.
61. Id. at 227-28.
62. Id. at 228 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 231.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 231-32, 235.
67. Id. at 242-43. The majority opinion has a textualist counter to this position. It argues
that ejusdem generis does not apply due to the syntactic structure of the sentence. Id. at 22526 (majority opinion).
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liability of the United States ‘the same as that of a private person
under like circumstance[s].’ ”68 If, against the background of this
general purpose, Congress had intended to deprive plaintiffs of all
remedies against law enforcement officers for detention of property,
“it would have done so in more express terms.”69
Justice Breyer offered a more “dynamic” take on the question.
Although he agreed with Justice Kennedy’s basic position, Breyer
felt compelled to “write separately to emphasize ... that the relevant
context extends well beyond Latin canons and other such purely
textual devices.”70 For Breyer, the question presented in Ali was
“not the [dictionary] meaning of the words” in general, but rather
“[t]o what circumstances did Congress intend the phrase, as used in
this statutory provision, to apply?”71 Legislators, Breyer reasoned,
“normally rely upon context to indicate the limits of time and place
within which they intend those words to do their linguistic work.”72
And for this reason, he thought the case was controlled by
“nontextual context[ual]” factors,73 including (1) the bill’s drafting
history,74 (2) the fact that a narrow exception squared with the
legislature’s remedial goal,75 and (3) the practical consequences of
the majority’s contrary construction, which would effectively
immunize “tens of thousands of officers performing [disparate]
tasks” from tort liability.76 Breyer found it implausible that
Congress, with one innocent phrase, would have intended to
“multiply the number of officers to whom [the exception] applies by
... orders of magnitude.”77
A desire to effectuate the authorial will of Congress unites all
three approaches in Ali. Justice Thomas feared that by straying
from the “any other law enforcement officer” clause, he would
rewrite the statute. By contrast, Justice Kennedy thought that by
68. Id. at 238 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 791400, at 32 (1946)).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 245.
74. Id. at 245-46.
75. Id. at 246.
76. Id. at 246-47.
77. Id. at 247.
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giving such an inclusive construction to that phrase, the majority
failed to carry out what Congress intended. Justice Breyer, too, was
concerned with Congress’s authorial will, which he thought was
quite clear: to permit tort recovery against the federal government
in the absence of other remedies. Diverse as these approaches were,
none stopped to ask why the correct object of judicial construction
was the legislature’s intent. Rather, all three assumed this to be the
case.
C. Dworkin’s Dissent
Ronald Dworkin has taken a contrarian view: he argues that
legislative intent should not be the ground or measure of statutory
construction.78 Instead, judges should interpret statutes in such a
way as to advance the “integrity” of the legal order as a whole.79
Integrity inheres in the consistent application of principles across
contexts.80 A legal order with integrity reaches outcomes that are
both principled and consistent. Confronting a controversy, the
Dworkinian judge surveys the law as a whole in order to determine
when and how the present controversy fits into the whole understood as a moral order. He interprets all of the relevant law
holistically, and in the best possible light—as the expression of a
community of principle.81 To thread this point, Dworkin famously

78. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 243 (1985).
79. See id. at 255-75 (introducing the notion of integrity); id. at 313-14 (applying integrity
to statutory interpretation).
80. This is expressed colloquially in the axiom that “like cases should be treated alike.”
See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 208 (2d ed. 1999) (“The rule of law also implies
the precept that similar cases be treated similarly.”); Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and
Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1039-43 (1990) (explaining this principle as part of a
deontological defense of precedent); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 426 (2007)
(“Legal principles must treat like instances alike.”). Compare Hart, supra note 15, at 624
(“[O]ne essential element of the concept of justice is the principle of treating like cases alike.”),
with Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1974)
(contending that Hart misunderstands the function of the principle of treating like cases
alike).
81. See DWORKIN, supra note 78, at 195-202; see also William D. Popkin, The Collaborative
Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 587-89 (1988) (exploring how
Dworkin’s notion of community instructs a “collaborative” theory of statutory interpretation).
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conjures the image of Hercules, the super-judge who has the skill
and stamina to discern the “right answer” to every case.82
Integrity is a normative claim respecting individual and political
morality. It has no particular connection to democracy or to the
democratic origins of a law. Nevertheless, at two points Dworkin
connects integrity to our concerns with democratic authorship as the
principle of political legitimacy. First, on occasion he links integrity
explicitly to an ideal of self-authorship: “The ideal [of self-legislation] needs integrity ... for a citizen cannot treat himself as the
author of a collection of laws that are inconsistent in principle.”83
Second, Dworkin thinks that integrity is a necessary condition of a
polity that can legitimately coerce compliance with its commands.84
We agree with the underlying premise linking these two points:
belief that we have authored the law for ourselves is necessary to
ground obligations of citizenship. But for us, the connection between
self-legislation and legitimacy is not about integrity among abstract
principles. It is, instead, about attachment to particular narratives.85 There is no reason to think that the whole of the legal order
is, or should be, at stake in the interpretation of every statute. Nor
is there reason to think that legitimacy turns on principled consistency across the board. Recall the example, from the Introduction,
of a decision with which a faculty member disagrees. To regard the
decision as legitimate, he does not demand that the same set of
principles support every appointment.86 If he demands too much
“integrity,” he will put himself entirely outside a workable sense of
responsibility for the faculty’s decisions. What matters is not the
conceptual purity of the decision, but that he can articulate a good
reason for what has been done in this instance—a reason he
recognizes even as he disagrees. Law is no different. Real judges,
not Hercules, never have to contend with the whole legal order.

82. See DWORKIN, supra note 78, at 239-40 (introducing the concept of Hercules, the superjudge); id. at 313-17 (discussing how Hercules approaches statutory interpretation).
83. Id. at 189.
84. See id. at 206-16.
85. See infra Part III.
86. Nor would the presence of such principles suffice to guarantee legitimate decisions.
“Anti-Semitism” is a principle—but it is not a principle that can engender legitimacy, no
matter how consistently it is applied.
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They have to contend with particular cases. The integrity that
counts is local and retail, not global and wholesale.
In the end, Dworkin is too principled. Politics is not carried by
principles. It is carried by persuasion. Having the better argument
does not entitle one to political success, for citizens must still be
persuaded. Persuasion in a democracy depends upon a narrative of
self-authorship. We must be persuaded to see the law as our own.
In this respect, a persuasive opinion must draw not only on
principles, but also on anecdotes, on history, on examples, on
hypothetical speculation, and on common sense. The goal is not to
satisfy Hercules, but to offer a convincing reading of a statute as an
act of popular self-government.
Judging requires judgment, not philosophy. Judgment is a matter
of character, of sensing the possibilities and speaking to the
perceived necessities of the times. A compelling narrative cannot
ignore our principles, but neither can those principles, standing
alone, account for what makes a narrative compelling. There are
always multiple principles that can be brought to bear in the
particular case; and there are always grounds for exceptions and
disagreements. The law does not necessarily fail when it exalts
charity or accommodation over principle. To the contrary, at times
these virtues are precisely what make legal persuasion successful.87
Dworkin is unable to account for this normative complexity
because—like the textualists—he sees judgment as a bounded act.
In place of the text, however, Dworkin substitutes principles.
Hercules is able to “read” the principles that script our community,
and having read them, he is bound to them. The particular case
makes no demands of its own. There is no place for the equitable
exception, no place for empathy, and no place for the sympathetic
imagination.88 There is only the relentless, if high-minded, mandate
of integrity. Instead of integrity, we need belief in self-authorship.

87. See generally Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Judging Pain, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 233 (2013);
Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1389 (2013).
88. See infra Part III.B.2.
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II. THE ANATOMY OF AUTHORSHIP
About any speech act, we can ask both what is said and who is
saying it. The author of a text is not necessarily its writer, and,
conversely, the writer cannot always claim authorship. Sometimes,
the distinction between writer and author points to the collective
nature of a project: a committee authors a report even if it is drafted
by one member. Sometimes, authors have assistants who help them
with the writing of a text. To draft is not to author, because the
drafter is not held accountable for the text.89 Authorship points to
accountability, and accountability to authority. For this reason, it
is not acceptable for a professor to blame his research assistant
when problems emerge with a published text that the assistant
drafted. Similarly, a judge cannot blame her law clerk for what the
opinion says. The clerk may have drafted the opinion, but she is not
the author. The clerk is not the author even if she wrote every word
of the opinion; no one wants to know what the clerk thought when
she drafted this text.
Authorship is not the act of drafting, but a social practice of
accountability. For that reason, an author need not be an actual
person. Corporations, for example, can be authors when the drafters
exercise the authority of the corporation.90 And certain legal
doctrines—for example, in copyright law—are designed precisely to
attribute authorship to the corporations that have a business
interest in a work, instead of the human who created it.91 Practices
of authorship attribution vary across fields. In the sciences, articles
89. For example, lawyers’ errors are customarily attributed to their clients. See, e.g.,
Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 922 (2012) (“[T]he attorney is the prisoner’s agent, and
under ‘well-settled principles of agency law,’ the principal bears the risk of [his agent’s]
negligent conduct.” (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753-54 (1992))).
90. See 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 1:2 (3d ed. 2011) (“The corporation ... enters into contracts, executes conveyances, and
conducts litigation in a legal capacity separate and distinct from its shareholders.”).
91. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03[A]
(Matthew Bender ed., 2013) (“The Copyright Act accords special treatment to works made for
hire: ‘[T]he employer or other person for whom the [for hire] work was prepared, is considered
the author for [copyright] purposes.’ ”) (alteration in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 201(b)); see
also Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-for-Hire Doctrine, 15 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2003) (discussing the historical development of corporate authorship in
copyright law).
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list as authors all members of the team, from highest to lowest; in
the humanities, individuals doing the same kind of work as coauthors in the sciences appear only as assistants thanked in a
footnote; in government, persons doing that same work, typically
staff, make no appearance at all.
Counterintuitively, authorship is less about writing than about
reading. Readers, drafters, and authors are all engaged in a
common social practice. Readers ordinarily attribute authorship just
as the text directs them. When we deny the text’s attribution of
authorship, we are often making an accusation of plagiarism.92
There has, in that case, been a violation of a norm within the social
practices of authorship. No one accuses a judge of plagiarism
because a clerk wrote the text of an opinion. Just the opposite: if a
law clerk claims authorship, we think he is violating the norms of
the practice.93
Not only must we distinguish drafters from authors; we must also
distinguish the authorial voice from the narrative voice. Every text
constructs an idea of its own narrator. The narrator is not necessarily the author. This is readily apparent in fiction; it is true even if
the fictional text speaks in the first person.94 Some postmodern
literary critics have observed this distinction of narrator from
author and concluded that there is no need to think about authors
whatsoever when studying texts.95 To consider the author, they
92. Mario Biagioli, Recycling Texts or Stealing Time?: Plagiarism, Authorship, and Credit
in Science, 19 INT’L J. OF CULTURAL PROP. 453, 455-60 (2012) (arguing that accusations of
plagiarism say more about the perceived unfairness of a practice—the fact that it seems to
clash with conventions of authorship—than about objective theories of what it means to
plagiarize).
93. See generally id. (arguing that the norms of attribution and correspondingly, of
plagiarism, are constructed from field to field).
94. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, What is an Author?, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY,
AND PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS 113, 129 (Donald Bouchard ed., Donald
Bouchard & Sherry Simon trans., 1977). Of course, Foucault was not the first to articulate
this principle; the distinction between author and narrator was familiar even in ancient
literature. See, e.g., Simon Goldhill, Framing and Polyphony: Readings in Hellenistic Poetry,
32 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CAMBRIDGE PHILOLOGICAL SOC’Y (NEW SERIES) 25 (1986) (providing
several examples of narrators in Hellenistic poetry being ironically subverted by the content
of the poems, and arguing that the poems are best understood by positing an awareness of the
author/narrator distinction).
95. For the classic statement of this position, see ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the
Author, in IMAGE-MUSIC-TEXT 142 (Stephen Heath trans., 1977). To some extent, literary
theorists are now backing away from Barthes’s extreme position. See, e.g., Wayne C. Booth,
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argue, is to approach the text from the outside—appropriate
perhaps if we are studying history or biography. One way in which
legal texts differ from literary texts is that in legal texts authorship
matters, for authorship is connected to a kind of ownership: the law
that legitimately claims us must be ours.
At the same time, certain kinds of texts want us to make precisely
this identification of author and narrator. The social practice of
reading these texts may go so far as to deny any other possibility of
authorship, asserting that there can be no access to the author
outside of the text. Religious texts are important examples. If you
believe the Bible to be literally the word of God, then you believe the
third-person, omniscient narrator of the text to be God, the author.
Of course, this does not mean that there was no human drafter.
Mohammed wrote the Koran, but he is not its author.96 He too was
scripting the word of God.
When believers see the “word of God” in religious texts, it is not
because they have independent means of verifying that God really
was the author. Asserting divine authorship reflects a social
practice of reading, not a fact independent of the text’s narrative.
When a Christian reads the Koran, he sees the same words as the
Muslim, but he is likely to attribute authorship to Mohammed,
rather than to God. The nonbeliever will likely say that God is the
narrator, but Mohammed is the author. Christians and Muslims do
not share in the same practice of finding meaning in the text, for
meaning is constituted in part by locating authorship. To deny God’s
authorship does not otherwise leave the meaning of the text
untouched.
What is true of religious texts is also true of legal texts: they
cannot be understood apart from social practices of reading that
include an attribution of authorship. In the legal and political
practices of the United States, that author is the people. The
practice of attributing authorship to the people is common across
our legal texts because they all exhibit the same problem of
Resurrection of the Implied Author: Why Bother?, in A COMPANION TO NARRATIVE THEORY 75
(James Phelan & Peter J. Rabinowitz eds., 2005) (discussing recent scholarship for and
against the significance of implied authors in literary analysis).
96. Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar, Who Wrote the Koran?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/07/magazine/07wwln-essay-t.html [http://perma.cc/MLS4EF2P].
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legitimacy: each must convey a sense of why it is law for us. The
construction of the author is a practice of holding ourselves
accountable.
Where founding texts are concerned, this point finds intuitive
traction. But the point gets lost in the professional discourse of
statutory construction. The idea of popular authorship has been
displaced, we suspect, by a disproportionate regard for voting as the
site of popular participation in the legislative process.97 Voting is an
important mechanism of accountability. But voting alone cannot
bear the weight of democratic legitimacy, especially when we
consider all those laws passed before any of us exercised our first
vote. The need to see that law as our own must be met with
resources other than the franchise. Those resources include the
narrative of self-authorship that the judicial opinion can offer in
interpreting a statute.
Consider first the Declaration of Independence.98 We know as a
matter of historical fact that Jefferson drafted much of the Declaration.99 If we were writing a biography of Jefferson, we might
attribute authorship to him. In doing so, we would hold him
accountable for the text as a matter of character, learning, skill, and
foresight. We would ask him where he got his ideas and what
motivated him to write as he did.100 We would be curious about
when he compromised, for what reasons, and with whom. We would
discuss the moral dilemma he faced as an owner of slaves. From the
perspective of a political practice of reading, however, Jefferson is
not the author of the Declaration. The political meaning of the text
does not turn on anything that Jefferson may have thought in the
97. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW (1990). Bork espouses the principle that “where the Constitution does not speak, the

majority morality prevails,” but views voting as the only legitimate means of deciding
“differences about moral choices.” Id. at 259. Similarly, the representation-reinforcing
approach to judicial review of John Hart Ely envisions voting as the primary means of popular
political participation. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 4-5 (1980); see also id. at 103 (“In a representative democracy value determinations
are to be made by our elected representatives, and if in fact most of us disapprove we can vote
them out of office.”).
98. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
99. PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
99-154 (1997) (describing the drafting and editing process).
100. Id.
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process of drafting. Politically, we do not hold him accountable for
this text.
Is it the case, then, that all those who signed the text that
Jefferson drafted are its authors? Is it simply a matter of collective
authorship? This is not quite right either; the drafters were acting
collectively, but they were not acting for themselves alone. Rather,
they were acting as representatives of their communities. They
could no more declare independence as a collection of individuals
than each could do so independently. They describe themselves as
“the Representatives of the united States of America, in General
Congress, Assembled.”101 They act “in the Name, and by Authority
of the good People of these Colonies.”102 And what they do is
“solemnly publish and declare, that these United Colonies are, and
of Right ought to be Free and Independent States.”103 The authority
they exercise, accordingly, is that of the people of these colonies.
Only the people could declare themselves free. It is the people who
are accountable for this act of authorship: they suffer the burdens
and the injuries of the war. If the British had managed to hang
every one of the signers for their act of treason, the colonies would
be no less free.
Understanding the people as the author allows us to see an
important inversion of the relationship we ordinarily imagine
between the author and the text. We think the author precedes the
text, that the author brings the text into being. We ask an author,
“What are you working on?” But with the Declaration of Independence, the text preceded the author. The people who declare through
their representatives are not subjects existing in the world prior to
their act of collective authorship; they do not first decide and then
author a text. They are not to be located on a map or a calendar. The
text is successful when it is received as the work of the people.
Declaring authorship in their name, this text calls the people into
existence. That author exists only as long as belief in the agency of
the people is maintained. In other words, self-authorship is a
practice that depends on the belief that we have given the law to
ourselves.
101. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 5 (U.S. 1776).
102. Id.
103. Id.
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If we lose that belief in the people’s authorial agency, we might
come to see this type of text as authored by a privileged elite who
deployed a populist rhetoric to advance their own interests. As long
as the belief remains, however, I will not receive the text as a gift
from a now-dead author. Rather, as I read the Declaration of Independence I acknowledge authorship. I hold myself accountable for
the text. In part, accountability means that I adopt as my own this
text’s narrative of revolution and its aspirations for justice.104 In
part, it means that I am responsible for the continued presence of
this text as part of a political practice. I celebrate and I teach this
text. I take it as a shared element of our common history. It figures
into the account I give of the meaning of our political project. The
beliefs at issue here are not subjective states of mind. Rather, they
are elements of a social practice. Authorship as a political practice
is not an aggregate of individual states of mind. A private
politics—including a politics of authorship—makes no more sense
than a private language.105 Self-authorship is one of the background
beliefs by which the community understands its practices and holds
itself accountable for its past and present.
This idea of authorial self-creation is inseparable from the text’s
continual reference to a narrator: “We”—as in “We hold these truths
to be self-evident.”106 Who is it that holds that “life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness” are “unalienable rights”?107 Surely this does
not refer to the drafters, as if the text were telling us what a
particular group of individuals in Philadelphia in the late eighteenth century happened to believe. The text is not recording their
beliefs, but is pronouncing a kind of communal creed. The “We,”
then, is each of us as we read this text together. At that moment, we

104. Lincoln, for example, appealed frequently to the Declaration as the fundamental text
of the American political project. MAIER, supra note 99, at 202-08; see also LEVINSON, supra
note 11, at 95-96, 140-41.
105. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 243-71 (G.E.M. Anscombe
et al. trans., 4th ed. 2009) (arguing for the impossibility of a language that cannot be learned
or translated by anyone other than its creator, on the grounds that it would be
incomprehensible even to its creator because he would not be able to establish meanings for
the signs).
106. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
107. Id.
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affirm our political identity as part of this “We” that narrates the
text. We say this.108
The step from the narrative “We” to the authorial “We the People”
is blurred in the practice of reading.109 The “we” that holds becomes
the “we” that declares. The rhetorical accomplishment of the text is
to lead the reader from holding to declaring: because I believe, I
declare. Precisely, here we see that the justice of the claims set forth
is not irrelevant to the issue of legitimacy. Rather, the arguments
from injustice (the King’s abuses),110 as well as the aspirations for
justice (self-evident truths),111 contribute to the persuasive character
of the text. Someone who believed its claims to be false would likely
have remained a loyalist. Today, someone who reads this text and
believes its claims to have been false is likely to give an historical
explanation of its creation. He will attribute its authorship elsewhere than to the people. Of course, such a reader might find other
grounds or other texts, through which to identify with the political
project of We the People.
The same distinctions and conjunctions are at work in the Constitution. We distinguish between what the Constitution says—for
example, “no state shall deny any person equal protection of the
laws”112—and who it is that we hear when reading that text. About
the text, we can and do ask whether the law it creates is just and
fair. Similarly, we argue about whether the institutions it establishes are efficient and democratic. We could have similar arguments about the constitutions of other nations. We pursue projects
of comparative constitutionalism with exactly these ambitions. Our
political relationship to the Constitution is not constituted in the
first instance by its justice or efficiency. Rather, that relationship
arises out of beliefs about authorship.
Just like with the Declaration, when we ask who the author of the
Constitution is, we are not asking who were its drafters. The
drafters met in Philadelphia.113 They, however, had even less
authority than did the signers of the Declaration; the text of the
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

BALKIN, supra note 11, at 59-74.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
Id. para. 2.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 5 (2005).
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Constitution still had to be approved by special assemblies in each
of the states.114 Nor is it the case that reading the text today we
imagine those assemblies of delegates as the authors. Drafters and
delegates were causal agents in the emergence of this text. Were we
to assign authorship to them, it would become very difficult to
explain why we continue to be bound by their authorial act. How are
they not simply the dead hand of the past? Even if we believe the
law they authored to be just, how is it ours?
Like the Declaration, the text of the Constitution creates a
narrator: “We the People ... do ordain and establish.”115 Prior to
ratification, this narrator had no more claim to authorship than the
narrator of any fictional text. Any one of us can draft a text that
presents itself as if it were written by We the People. Suppose the
draft had not been ratified, would anyone attribute authorship to
this narrator, despite what the text said? Ratification begins a social
practice under which we read the narrator as the author. Once
again, the authority of the text is linked to a belief in our relationship to this collective, transgenerational agent that appears as
narrator and author. Because we are authors of this text, it has
authority over us. The legitimacy of the Constitution, but not its
justice, is located in this practice of reading.
Justice is not irrelevant to this practice of holding ourselves
accountable as authors. We will not be persuaded to see ourselves
as authors if we believe the content of the constitutional text to be
fundamentally unjust. We would not author such a text. When
radical abolitionists denounced the Constitution as a “covenant with
death, and an agreement with hell,” they were making just such a
move of disavowing authorship—they could not imagine themselves
authoring such an unjust text.116 There was a corresponding move
114. See id. at 5-8.
115. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
116. Eleventh Annual Meeting: Of the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society, 13 THE
LIBERATOR (Boston), Feb. 3, 1843, at 19. A resolution was first proposed “[t]hat no abolitionist
can consistently demand less than a dissolution of the union between northern freedom and
southern slavery, as essential to the preservation of the one and the abolition of the other.”
Id. William Lloyd Garrison suggested the resolution be amended: “That the compact which
exists between the North and the South is ‘a covenant with death, and an agreement with
hell’—involving both parties in atrocious criminality; and should be immediately annulled.”
Id. For more contemporary exposition of this theme, see BALKIN, supra note 11, at 111-23;
LEVINSON, supra note 11, at 65-68, 74-80; J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other
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in the secessionist states, when people could not imagine themselves
authoring a text that would allow federal intervention against the
institution of slavery.117
A court’s role follows from this fundamental principle of selfauthorship. When interpreting the Constitution, a court is not to
discern what the drafters meant, but what the people authored. The
courts must persuade the people to take the position of authorship;
they must present the meaning of the text such that the people can
hold themselves accountable for this text. If courts confuse drafters
with authors, the Constitution becomes the dead hand of the past
and the people can no longer understand how they govern themselves.118 They cannot understand because they do not govern.
The pattern of distinguishing drafters from authors continues
with legislation. We know that in practice, legislators rarely draft
the actual statutory text—but even if they did, they would not be
the authors of the law. They are not the authors because they have
authority only as representatives. Indeed, the nature of our federal
lawmaking process guarantees that it is difficult to localize
authorship in any institution. Congress acts, but then so does the
President. Many of the legal rules that actually apply to us are
drafted by administrative agencies. Are they the authors? If that is
all we see, then we are likely to worry about an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority.119 We must see through the

Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1703 (1997) (all exploring some of these issues, with
further historical and theoretical references).
117. For example, see the proslavery constitutional rhetoric of Congressman Toombs from
Georgia in 1849. AVERY O. CRAVEN, THE GROWTH OF SOUTHERN NATIONALISM 1848-1861, at
68 (1953) (“In spite of ‘as much attachment to the Union ... under the Constitution of our
fathers, as any freeman ought to have,’ he did not ‘hesitate to avow before this House and the
country ... that if by your legislation you seek to drive us from the territories of California and
New Mexico ... and to abolish slavery in this District, thereby attempting to fix a national
degradation upon half the States of this Confederacy, I am for disunion.’ ”).
118. See supra note 105.
119. Not surprisingly, deferential standards of administrative review are quick to
evaporate in cases that involve fundamental values. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497, 505 (2007) (refusing to defer to the agency’s constrictive construction of the statute due
to, among other things, the “pressing environmental challenge” that global warming
presents); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274-75 (2006) (holding that the Attorney General
was not entitled to deference when he construed the Controlled Substances Act to impose
criminal penalties on doctors that assisted in euthanasia pursuant to Oregon law).
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regulation to the statute and through the statute to its author—the
people.
Particular individuals must take certain steps to make the
law—including writing—but that does not make them the
authors.120 Legislators draft a law; the President signs it into effect;
and administrative agencies promulgate regulations to give it
force.121 Still, the law is in no sense their law, for the authority they
exercise is not their own. They might indeed be held electorally
accountable for their work, but whatever happens to them personally has no effect on our law. Long after they are gone, the law
remains and with it the puzzle of its legitimacy. The point here is
not simply that the meaning of a text may be beyond the control of
its author, for example, the reader of a novel might understand it
differently than its author does. Reading a legal text, we want to
attribute meaning to its author. Without that attribution of
authorship, the text would not be part of a project of self-government. This defines judicial responsibility over statutory construction: the court must interpret the statute as an expression of our
common project of democratic self-government. If such an interpretation is not available, the law is illegitimate, even if it is not held
unconstitutional.122
III. SELF-AUTHORSHIP AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
We argue that democratic self-authorship grounds the best
normative theory of statutory construction—a claim explored
120. See, e.g., Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 871 (1930) (“[I]n
law, the specific individuals who make up the legislature are men to whom a specialized
function has been temporarily assigned. That function is not to impose their will ... on their
fellow citizens, but to ‘pass statutes,’ which is a fairly precise operation.”).
121. See Administrative Law Guide, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/
administrative.php [http://perma.cc/X8DT-UTQV] (last updated Feb. 28, 2014) (describing
how administrative agencies function, both through creating regulations and through
enforcing existing law); The Legislative Process, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://www.house.gov/content/learn/legislative_process/ [http://perma.cc/ZT66-8YQK] (last
visited Sept. 11, 2014) (describing the process through which a law is drafted, voted on, and
signed into effect).
122. Notably, the claim runs in only one direction. If the court holds a statute
unconstitutional, that holding entails that the statute is unimaginable as our own; but if the
court does not hold a statute unconstitutional, that holding does not necessarily entail that
we can imagine it as our own.
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philosophically in Part IV. But democratic self-authorship is more
than a normative theory. We offer it as a theory of existing practices
of statutory construction. To qualify as a theory of our practices,
there must exist, in Dworkin’s terms, “fit” between what the theory
demands and what courts are actually doing.123 Accordingly, before
we elaborate the normative theory of democratic self-authorship, we
take up the inquiry into fit. In this Part, we maintain that judges
have been guided by an intuitive sense that the rule of law and the
rule of the people are one and the same. Of course, the fit is not
perfect, for judges have also labored under a fear that they will be
accused of usurpation of the legislative role. The fit is, however,
closer than one might have expected. Indeed, if the ambition of the
judicial practice is really to discern the authorial intent of the
legislature, democratic self-authorship can explain many aspects of
statutory construction that appear puzzling.
A. “Super” Statutes
Recently, considerable scholarly attention has focused on what
Bill Eskridge and John Ferejohn call “super-statutes”: statutes so
deeply “entrenched” in our legal order that they operate almost like
constitutional provisions.124 Examples include Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,125 the Sherman Antitrust Act,126 and the
Endangered Species Act.127 Not surprisingly, judicial construction
123. DWORKIN, supra note 78, at 228-58 (1986); see id. at 255 (“Convictions about fit will
provide a rough threshold requirement that an interpretation of some part of the law must
meet if it is to be eligible at all.”).
124. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010) (adopting the closed spelling, “superstatute”); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216 (2001) (“A superstatute is a law or series of laws that (1) seeks to establish a new normative or institutional
framework for state policy and (2) over time does ‘stick’ in the public culture such that (3) the
super-statute and its institutional or normative principles have a broad effect on the
law—including an effect beyond the four corners of the statute.”) For a helpful exposition of
Eskridge’s and Ferejohn’s positions, see Paul Frymer, Statutes, Courts, and Democracy in
America, 47 TULSA L. REV. 229, 232-38 (2011) (book review).
125. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-705, 78 Stat. 253, 253-59 (1964) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 124, at 1237-42.
126. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2012); see Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 124, at 1231-37.
127. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012); see Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 124, at 1242-46.
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of these statutes does not focus on locating legislative intent in the
technical sense that we saw in Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons.128
Instead, courts focus on broader public values. Courts are not
answering the question of what a particular legislative body at a
particular moment did. They are answering the question of what it
is we are doing.
Consider Ricci v. Destefano, a recent Title VII case that considered whether employers may adopt race-conscious policies in order
to ensure compliance with Title VII’s antidiscrimination regime.129
The City of New Haven, looking to make promotions within the fire
department, administered a lieutenant’s exam that yielded demographically skewed results. In the aggregate, white firefighters
performed much better than black firefighters, and of the top fifteen
candidates—the group slated for promotion—all but one was
white.130 Fearing that certification of the exam results would invite
a Title VII disparate impact suit, the City Service Board of New
Haven voted to administer a new exam.131 This brought a Title VII
suit from white firefighters, who claimed that the decision not to
certify the examination results amounted to an impermissible use
of race in an employment decision.132 In other words, Ricci “sets at
odds [the] core directives” of Title VII133—subsection (k) requires
employers to avoid employment policies that yield a “disparate
impact” along racial lines, whereas sub-section (a) forbids employers
from engaging in “disparate treatment” along racial lines.134
Formally, Ricci raised an issue of statutory interpretation. Yet no
member of the Court found the text of Title VII, the statute’s
legislative history, or even inquiry into Congress’s larger “purpose,”
to be of much help.135 Indeed, however fierce their other disagreements, all nine Justices seemed to concur as to the meaning of the
text and the purpose behind it: the aim of Title VII is to end racial

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

552 U.S. 214 (2008); see supra Part I.B.
557 U.S. 557, 557-63 (2009).
Id. at 561-63.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 562-63.
Id. at 624 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 557 (majority opinion).
See, e.g., id. at 580-81.
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discrimination in the workplace.136 The question is how. It is the
same question, as Kennedy noted, that has beset the Court’s
constitutional jurisprudence for many decades.137 It is the question
of whether our commitment to racial equality entails color-blindness
or color-consciousness. To tackle this difficult question, the opinions
in Ricci placed these competing principles within broader narratives
both of a national problem, and of the national effort to address that
problem.138 Their disagreement was over which narrative offers the
most persuasive account.
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy invoked a narrative of
compromise: as a nation, we live by principles, but we also recognize
the value of well-functioning institutions and the need to respect the
expectations those institutions create.139 To his mind, the petitioners’ position—that Title VII proscribes all race-conscious employment decisions—and the respondents’ position—that Title VII
allows for race-conscious employment decisions as long as employers
have a “good faith belief” that compliance requires them—were both
too strong.140 Instead, the right construction would assure “all
groups ... a fair opportunity [to obtain] promotions,” but also
recognize the “legitimate expectation” that employees have “not to
be judged on the basis of race,” and to have the parameters of the
136. E.g., id. at 580 (“[O]ur decision must be consistent with the important purpose of Title
VII—that the workplace be an environment free of discrimination, where race is not a barrier
to opportunity.”); id. at 628 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The very purpose of the provision is
to ensure that individuals are hired and promoted based on qualifications manifestly
necessary to successful performance of the job in question, qualifications that do not screen
out members of any race.”).
137. See id. at 582 (majority opinion).
138. This excludes Justice Scalia’s concurrence, id. at 594-96 (Scalia, J., concurring), which
simply makes an analytic point about the tension between Title VII’s disparate impact
provision and the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 595-96 (“[T]he war between disparate
impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin
thinking about how—and on what terms—to make peace between them.”).
139. See id. at 583 (majority opinion) (“Resolving the statutory conflict in this way allows
the disparate-impact prohibition to work in a manner that is consistent with other provisions
of Title VII.”).
140. Compare id. at 580-81 (“The rule petitioners offer would run counter to what we have
recognized as Congress’ intent that ‘voluntary compliance’ be the ‘preferred means of
achieving the objectives of Title VII.’ ”) (quoting Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 515
(1986)), with id. at 581-82 (noting that the City’s request for broad latitude to comply with the
disparate impact provision would also contravene Title VII). Therefore, Justice Kennedy
concludes, “a more appropriate balance” is proper. Id. at 582.
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established “selection criteria” respected.141 In other words, employers need latitude to ensure that minorities have the chance to rise
up the ranks, but employees are also entitled to a stable promotional process. The national commitment is to fairness, which
requires acknowledgement of both principles while working out
retail solutions in particular circumstances.
In his concurrence, Justice Alito advanced a different narrative,
individual merit. Alito focused on the firefighters passed over by the
city’s decision.142 Emphasizing that all they sought was “a fair
chance to move up the ranks in their chosen profession,” Alito
lamented the “personal sacrifices” the plaintiffs made.143 Two stories
were especially poignant to Alito. Frank Ricci, who suffered from
dyslexia, “studied an average of eight to thirteen hours a day ... even
listening to audio tapes while driving his car.”144 Benjamin Vargas,
a Hispanic, had to “give up a part-time job, and his wife had to take
leave from her own job in order to take care of their three young
children while Vargas studied.”145 By treating Ricci’s and Vargas’s
plights as equivalent, Alito implicitly disclaimed the notion that his
construction of Title VII is about helping whites succeed; it is,
instead, about ensuring that everyone, no matter their race, enjoys
“evenhanded enforcement of the law.”146
Alito also dedicated significant energy to insinuating that New
Haven’s stated reason for throwing out the exam—to avoid disparate impact liability—was “a pretext,” and that “the City’s real
reason was [an] illegitimate ... desire to placate a politically
important racial constituency.”147 In Alito’s view, the record contains
evidence from which “a jury could rationally infer that city officials
worked behind the scenes to sabotage the promotional examinations
because they knew that, were the exams certified, the Mayor would
incur the wrath of ... influential leaders of New Haven's AfricanAmerican community.”148 Whatever one might think of disparate
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 585.
See id. at 607 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 608.
Id. at 597.
Id. at 598 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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impact tests generally, redistribution of public resources to a
powerful, local interest group cannot fit within a narrative of the
people’s purpose in authoring the statute. That is not why we
passed Title VII.149
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg offered still another narrative:
undoing racial subordination.150 She opened by observing that “[i]n
assessing claims of race discrimination, context matters.”151
Although Ginsburg acknowledged that plaintiffs like Ricci and
Vargas “understandably attract ... sympathy,” their individual
plights cannot transform the institutional reality in New Haven.152
African Americans and Hispanics, who account for nearly 60 percent
of the population, “[are being] served—as it was in the days of
undisguised discrimination—by a fire department in which
members of racial and ethnic minorities are rarely seen in command
positions.”153 New Haven should have an opportunity to rectify this
situation. Whether, and how, Title VII should limit the means by
which the city may do so is a question that must be framed in terms
of the history of Title VII’s reception. After Title VII went into effect,
“[e]mployers responded to the law by eliminating rules and practices
that explicitly barred racial minorities from ‘white’ jobs.”154 Yet
“removing overtly race-based job classifications did not usher in
149. See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
HARV. L. REV. 494, 552-66 (2003) (discussing the group-oriented aspects of disparate impact
law as compared to the more individual-oriented equal protection jurisprudence); Cass R.
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 59-64 (1985)
(discussing as a fundamental concern of administrative law the desire to avoid favoring
interest groups, and procedural safeguards that are meant to protect against this possibility).
In certain cases, the “disparate impact doctrine does involve an element of differential group
treatment by race.” Primus, supra, at 566. Therefore, “[i]f disparate impact doctrine were to
become more visible ... many people would understand the doctrine as evincing some kind of
government concern with the allocation of employment among racial groups.” Id. at 576.
150. The difference between the majority and dissent tracks the difference that has
emerged in scholarship between the so-called “anticlassification” and the so-called
“antisubordination” view. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470,
1470-78 (2004); Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1281-86 (2011) (discussing a
third approach—antibalkinization—which focuses on racial cohesion).
151. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 608 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 609.
154. Id. at 620.
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genuinely equal opportunity.”155 Rather, “[m]ore subtle—and
sometimes unconscious—forms of discrimination replaced once
undisguised restrictions.”156
Ginsburg found the majority’s identification of “intra-statutory
discord” baffling.157 In her view, the disparate impact provision and
the disparate treatment provision of Title VII both pursue the same
goal: dismantling racial hierarchy. New Haven’s actions simply “do[]
not present ... race-based discrimination” of the sort that Title VII
targeted.158 In contrast to Kennedy’s insistence on pragmatic
balancing, and Alito’s defense of color-blindness, Ginsburg told a
story of historical redemption. We have not yet recovered from the
sordid legacy of slavery and Jim Crow racism. To interpret the
disparate-treatment provision and disparate-impact provision as
“discord[ant]”159 rather than “complementary”160 would be to
frustrate the very goal codified by Title VII, and expounded in
Griggs: the promise “that groups long denied equal opportunity
would not be held back by [practices] fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”161
The dispute among the Justices is not over the statute’s text. Nor
is it over legislative intent. Rather, each opinion takes the judicial
role to be that of persuading us to read the statute as a part of a
larger national narrative. Each opinion offers a distinct account of
what we are trying to do in addressing our history of racial injustice.

155. Id.
156. Id. Ginsburg connects this statement with her view of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971). For Ginsburg, Griggs stands for the proposition that there is no “conflict
between an employer’s obligations under the statute's disparate-treatment and disparateimpact provisions.” Ricci, 557 U.S. at 624 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Rather, these are “twin pillars of Title VII,” both working toward “ending workplace
discrimination and promoting genuinely equal opportunity.” Id. This does not mean that
employers may engage in disparate treatment—as New Haven did—with impunity. But it
does mean that they should enjoy latitude when making difficult employment decisions, and
that if employers have “good cause” to believe that the absence of disparate treatment would
result in a disparate impact lawsuit, then, per Griggs, they should be immunized from
liability. See id.
157. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 626 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 644.
159. Id. at 626.
160. Id. at 625.
161. Id. at 644 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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We are all able to recognize each account, even if we disagree with
it.
None of the opinions approach Title VII as if it were the outcome
of a conflict of interest among distinct groups, with some winning
and some losing. Likewise, no account sees the statute as a bargain,
negotiating a division of public benefits. Instead, all three construct
narratives of self-government under law.162 A theory of interpretation cannot identify which account is correct. In some sense, all
three are correct. All three offer plausible interpretations of our
national commitment to end racial discrimination. Different
observers will prioritize one account over the others; different
circumstances might lead to different choices. But it becomes clear
that the judge’s role is to match narratives to circumstances, and
then to persuade us to see ourselves in that account.
B. “Ordinary” Statutes
Although “super” statutes attract more attention, the interpretive
question they present is not different in kind from that of ordinary
statutes. All laws are subject to the same demand of legitimacy. We
do not have to agree with them, or with every construction of them,
but we must be able to understand them as our own. To see how
ordinary statutes recapitulate basic concerns of legitimacy, one need
look no further than to the canons of construction that courts often
use to interpret them.
1. Harmony
A number of canons articulate a presumption of harmony among
discrete legal materials. Take, for example, the longstanding canon
of constitutional avoidance: ambiguous statutes are to be interpreted so as to avoid constitutional problems.163 Under the selfauthorship view, this canon makes perfect sense. It is not merely
about prudence, but about constructing a field of legal meaning. The
same collective agent, we the people, is the author of both constitu162. See supra notes 139-61 and accompanying text.
163. See Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1550 (2000).

2014]

STATUTES AND DEMOCRATIC SELF-AUTHORSHIP

153

tional and statutory law. Marking one as constitutional, the people
have indicated a normative priority; they have marked out a general
purpose. The question for a court is whether we, as author of the
constitutional provision, could imagine ourselves as simultaneously
the author of the statute. Can we imagine affirming authorship of
both at once?164
Similarly, courts also take for granted that statutes should be
interpreted consistently with previously enacted statutes. But why?
New lawmakers often contravene the work of previous lawmakers;
in fact, that is often precisely what new lawmakers are elected to
do.165 If legislative will is the ground of judicial construction, it is
hard to see why the presumption should run one way rather than
the other. The question would be precisely whether lawmakers
intended harmonization. In context, the answer might be yes, but
it would not be presumptively so.166
Consider, for instance, American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant, the most recent in a long line of cases resolving a
164. Compare the practice in Germany, in which constitutional rights apply horizontally
(they regulate conduct between individuals) as well as vertically (they regulate the conduct
of state actors). See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights,
102 MICH. L. REV. 387, 393-411 (2003) (discussing legal systems in which constitutional rights
have a horizontal application, including Germany’s); Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the
Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 431-44 (2008)
(comparing the American system, on the “vertical” end of the spectrum, with systems on the
more “horizontal” end of the spectrum).
165. See Christopher Coats, Obama Joins Tradition of Overturning Predecessor’s Executive
Orders, FINDING DULCINEA (Nov. 10, 2008, 5:54 PM), http://www.findingdulcinea.com/news/
politics/2008/November/Obama-Joins-Tradition-of-Overturning-Predecessor-s-ExecutiveOrders.html [http://perma.cc/E9CN-L234] (analogizing the President’s efforts to contravene
his predecessor’s efforts to similar tactics employed by lawmakers).
166. Consider, for example, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub.
L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012)). RFRA
begins by noting its purpose is “to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and to guarantee
its application in all cases in which free exercise of religion is substantially burdened,” after
the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), had
abrogated this standard. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012). Also consider the Military
Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, which responded to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), and fundamentally altered the
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. For a more
comprehensive survey of “legislative overrides,” see Matthew R. Christiansen & William
Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
1967-2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317 (2014).
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tension between the Federal Arbitration Act, which compels the
enforcement of arbitration clauses in private contracts, and other
federal laws whose efficacy has been dampened by the existence of
compulsory arbitration clauses.167 The plaintiff in Italian Colors
Restaurant, a neighborhood restaurant, attempted to sue American
Express for violating federal antitrust law, on the theory that
American Express abused its market power by charging merchants
fees 30 percent higher than other credit cards.168 The contract
between American Express and Italian Colors required individual
arbitration of all disputes; so American Express moved to compel
arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).169 Italian
Colors responded by arguing that individual arbitration would be
prohibitively expensive because the maximum possible award would
not even cover attorneys’ fees.170 Therefore, waiving the individual
arbitration requirement was necessary to make the antitrust suit
practically actionable.171
The Court held that the FAA requirement could not be
waived—the arbitration clause was enforceable, notwithstanding
concern about the economics of antitrust litigation.172 In response to
the argument that this result would undermine the force of the
federal antitrust laws, the majority reasoned that those laws “do not
guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every
claim.”173 Simply put, nothing about the federal antitrust scheme
“evinc[es] an intention to preclude a waiver of class-action procedure.”174 Nor, in the majority’s view, was a “judge-made exception to
the FAA” warranted in this case.175 The only cases recognizing such
an exception are those in which an arbitration clause operates to
strip would-be plaintiffs of the “right to pursue statutory
167. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). For the second most recent case in this line, see 14 Penn Plaza
LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 251 (2008) (holding that employees were required, per their
employment contract, to bring an age discrimination claim via arbitration).
168. Italian Colors Rest., 113 S. Ct. at 2308.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2312.
173. Id. at 2309.
174. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
175. Id. at 2310.
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remedies.”176 Here, by contrast, the plaintiff’s remedial right was
perfectly safe. Plaintiffs could only claim that arbitration would
deprive them of the opportunity to recover a sizeable damages
award.177
In her dissent, Justice Kagan bristled at the majority’s formalism.
In her view, the relevant principle was that “[a]n arbitration clause
may not thwart federal law, irrespective of exactly how it does
so”178—whether it does so formally, or merely functionally. By
neglecting this principle, the Court effectively permitted American
Express to “insulate[ ] itself from antitrust liability—even if it has
in fact violated the law.”179
For our purposes, the important point is not to decide between the
majority and dissent, but to note that both sides felt it necessary to
consider the FAA alongside the federal antitrust laws at all. If
legislative will is the lodestar, why should courts assume that
legislative bodies intend harmony among statutes—especially,
though perhaps not exclusively—when the statutes were drafted
and enacted by different sets of individual lawmakers? Generally,
legislators intend for the law they enact to be effective, which often
requires that later laws take precedence over earlier laws. Harmony
is irrelevant.
On the legislative authorship account, the appropriate principle
of harmony among discrete statutes would be no principle at all.
The statute in question would be construed according to the will of
the legislature that passed it. This purpose might involve harmony,
if the legislature intended harmony, but there would be no general
mandate for harmony.
In practice, however, when two statutes intersect, courts read the
legal materials together in order to discern a common purpose
behind them. “Purpose,” in this setting, does not refer to the actual
purpose of any particular legislator, or even of the legislative body
as a whole—as though, for example, Congress, when it enacted the
FAA, consciously sought to maintain space for private antitrust
176. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
637 (1985)).
177. See id. at 2308.
178. Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
179. Id.
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actions. Nor is “purpose” simply a reflection of judicial will. When
Justice Kagan decries the cannibalizing effect of the FAA on antitrust actions, she is not saying that she finds antitrust enforcement
a more important policy; rather, she is saying that we do.180 The
formalism of the majority, Kagan says, cannot ground a coherent
narrative of what we the people are doing.181 We decided to enact
the FAA for many reasons. But none of them was to subvert the
force of other important federal laws.182
2. Equity
A second interpretive practice that fits poorly with the legislative
will view, but that self-authorship principles easily reconstruct, is
the use of equitable principles to arrive at interpretations that clash
with plain statutory language. Equity allows judges to avoid
miscarriages of justice. But ensuring just outcomes can come at the
expense of “faithful agency” to legislative will.183
Consider McQuiggin v. Perkins, a case about the flexibility of
federal appeals under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).184 AEDPA circumscribes federal
jurisdiction over habeas claims originating from state prosecutions.
Among other things, § 2244(d) of the Act imposes a one-year
deadline—from the date of the final judgment—on federal habeas
petitions.185 A defendant who fails to meet this deadline has
“procedurally defaulted.”186 Ordinarily, to overcome a procedural
180. See id. at 2315.
181. See id. at 2318-19.
182. See id. at 2315.
183. See Manning, supra note 8, at 8 (noting that “[t]extualists must take [equitable
powers] seriously,” for if such powers are ascribable to federal judges, it would “undercut” the
ideal of “faithful agen[cy]”). But see Eskridge, supra note 10, at 998 (arguing for compatibility
between equitable remedies and the faithful agent ideal: “words ... involve policies chosen by
the legislature and enduring principles suggested by the common law, the law of nations, and
the Constitution”). As much force as Eskridge’s position might have in general, it is not easily
squared with a case like McQuiggin v. Perkins, in which legislative purpose and deeper justice
are at loggerheads, no matter how “dynamically” the former is construed. 133 S. Ct. 1924
(2013).
184. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.); 133 S. Ct. 1924.
185. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
186. “Procedural default” is a doctrine developed by the Court “to limit the habeas practice
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default, a defendant must show “cause”—for example, that he
missed a filing deadline due to abandonment by counsel,187 or that
the state appellate process afforded him no opportunity to raise the
relevant challenge.188
McQuiggin considered whether a successful actual innocence
claim can cure a procedural default under § 2244(d),189 by adducing
new evidence, procured since the conviction, that no reasonable
juror could have convicted the defendant.190 In plainer English,
should a defendant be allowed to appeal his conviction, many years
after the normal window for review has closed, if new evidence
emerges to suggest that he did not commit the crime? A narrow
majority of the Court said yes, drawing an “actual innocence”
exception to the one-year filing deadline.191
Michigan had maintained that granting an equitable exception
would “rende[r] superfluous [the] carefully scripted scheme” set out
by Congress.192 The McQuiggin majority responded that the
equitable exception was drawn carefully, alleviating any concern
about rendering the text “superfluous.”193 The state’s point, however,
was not that an equitable exception for actual innocence claims
would render § 2244(d) superfluous in every context; rather, only
that it would render § 2244(d) superfluous in the specific context of
actual innocence claims. As Justice Scalia asserted in his dissent,
“By the Court’s logic, a statute banning littering could simply be
deemed to contain an exception for cigarette butts; after all, the
that it had radically expanded in the early or mid-twentieth century to include review of the
merits of conviction and not merely jurisdiction of the convicting court.” McQuiggin, 133 S.
Ct. at 1937 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The doctrine “holds that a state prisoner's default of his
federal claims ‘in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule’
bars federal habeas review of those claims.” Id. (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
750 (1991)).
187. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 917 (2012); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631,
652 (2010). In McQuiggin, the majority opinion emphasizes the difference between equitable
tolling (in Holland and Maples) and an equitable exception (in McQuiggin)—but obviously the
two raise exactly the same issues. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1931.
188. See Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1914-15 (2013); Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct.
1309, 1313, 1320 (2012).
189. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1933 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 18).
193. Id.
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statute as thus amended would still cover something. That is not
how a court respectful of the separation of powers should interpret
statutes.”194 As he wryly remarked, “One would have thought it too
obvious to mention that this Court is duty bound to enforce AEDPA,
not amend it.”195 If Congress had authored the AEDPA, Justice
Scalia’s critique would be virtually irrefutable. The majority offered
no evidence that Congress intended an equitable exception under
these circumstances. In fact, Congress explicitly included innocencebased exceptions to other sections of AEDPA, implicitly suggesting
that it intended no such exception here.196
But this is ultimately beside the point. As difficult as it may be to
reconcile the opinion with legislative authorship, McQuiggin comes
back to a very basic point about justice. The narrative upon which
Justice Ginsburg relies is immediately recognizable and normatively
self-evident: the innocent will not be abandoned. The American
people would not author a law that allows innocent people to sit in
prison, much less on death row, because of legal technicalities. A
law that fails to acknowledge this would be difficult to recognize as
our own.197
3. Gymnastics
A final practice that casts doubt on the legislative author view is
the adoption of what one might call hermeneutical gymnastics. One
example is Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, the famous
nineteenth-century case in which the Court held that recruiting a
minister from abroad did not violate a statute prohibiting “the
importation or migration, of any alien or aliens, any foreigner or
foreigners ... under contract or agreement ... to perform labor or
service of any kind.”198 Despite the text, the Court concluded that “a
194. Id. at 1939-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 1938.
196. See id. at 1939-41. The majority’s answer to this rejoinder is unconvincing. Id. at 193335 (majority opinion).
197. This is why the iconic first line of Coleman v. Thompson is so jarring—“This is a case
about federalism.” 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991). The federalism frame cannot keep at bay the
deeper narrative of innocence and justice beneath. Id. at 745-50.
198. 143 U.S. 457, 458-59 (1892) (quoting Alien Contract Labor Act of 1885, ch. 164, § 1,
23 Stat. 332, 332 (repealed 1952)).
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Christian nation” would not do such a thing.199 Another case, Welsh
v. United States, which also involved the exceptional status of
religion in America, shows just how far these gymnastic maneuvers
can go.200
The question presented in Welsh was whether a statute granting
conscientious objector status on religious grounds also granted
equivalent status to objectors who explicitly denied that their objections were based on religious belief.201 The law in question, the
Universal Military Training and Service Act, made registration for
military service compulsory for men over the age of eighteen.202
Section 6(j) of the Act carved out an exemption for certain types of
conscientious objections: “Nothing contained in this title shall be
construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training
and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason
of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to
participation in war in any form.”203 The Act went on, however, to
clarify that “[r]eligious training and belief ” refers to “an individual’s
belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to
those arising from any human relation,” and that it explicitly does
not refer to “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views
or a merely personal moral code.”204
Welsh was convicted for refusing to submit to military service.205
On appeal, he argued that he was entitled to conscientious objector
status under section 6(j), despite the fact that he was not opposed to
war on religious grounds.206 In fact, Welsh made it very clear that
he was vehemently opposed not only to war, but also to religiouslygrounded objections to war.207 As he put it: “I believe that human life
is valuable in and of itself; in its living; therefore I will not injure or
kill another human being. This belief (and the corresponding ‘duty’
199. Id. at 471-72.
200. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
201. Id. at 335-36.
202. See Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L No. 80-759, 62 Stat. 604, 605 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (2012)).
203. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 336 (citing 62 Stat. 612 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 456(j) (2012))).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 335.
206. Id. at 335, 341.
207. Id. at 341.
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to abstain from violence toward another person) is not ‘superior to
those arising from any human relation.’ ”208
The last sentence of Welsh’s statement is cribbed verbatim from
the statute—“duties superior to those arising from any human
relation”209—but for just the opposite purpose than one might
expect. Welsh cited the statute precisely to deny that he was
conforming to the designation provided for by section 6(j). Welsh’s
claim of conscientious objection was therefore an act of defiance
against the terms of the very exemption he sought to invoke. Could
Welsh seek refuge in a safe harbor whose basis he had explicitly
repudiated?
The Court said yes, holding that objections that rest on “moral”
or “ethical” principles, as long as they are “deeply held,”210 are
entitled to the section 6(j) exemption, despite the explicit exclusion
of such objections in the last sentence of that section. Establishing
this claim required some gymnastics. The Court was forced to argue
that Welsh’s objection could not be categorized as an “essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical view[ ],” nor as a “personal
moral code,”211 and from there, to reason that Welsh’s objection must
be religious in nature—on the theory that if his objection did not fit
into one of the exceptional categories, it must hail from the main
one. This inference is fair enough. The difficulty lies in deciding, at
the threshold, that Welsh’s objection was not an “essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical view[ ].”212 By its own lights,
the objection seemed precisely that.
It is little surprise, then, that the dissenting Justices in Welsh
argued that the majority’s view utterly failed to “enforce the will of
Congress.”213 The failure is almost self-evident: the majority opinion
openly flouted the spirit of section 6(j), which aimed to cabin, not to
extend, the availability of conscientious objector status. Yet it would
be wrong to call Welsh a failed act of statutory construction. It created a compelling narrative of collective authorship—one that sounds
in free expression and freedom of conscience. In this narrative,
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 343.
Id. at 336 (citing 62 Stat. 612 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (2012))).
Id. at 344.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 336 (citing 62 Stat. 612 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (2012))).
Id. at 368 (White, J., dissenting).
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citizenship does not come at the expense of forsaking private moral
beliefs. Just as we cannot embrace a legal regime in which administrative convenience takes precedence over truth, we cannot embrace
one that leaves no room for individual conscience.
In other words, much as the dissenters in Welsh were right to
accuse the majority of failing to “enforce the will of Congress,” they
were wrong to conclude that the majority had enforced the Court’s
will.214 Democratic self-authorship resists the elision from (1) the
observation that legislative will has been disregarded to (2) the idea
that a judge has simply substituted his will in its place. A successful
act of statutory construction persuades us to see our collective will
in and through the legislation. Of course, a judge can mishandle this
task; he might fail to produce a compelling narrative of selfauthorship, just as he might fail to persuade us of the nature of the
legislative will. But that does not transform the nature of the
interpretive task, which is to align democratic self-government and
the rule of law.
IV. SELF-AUTHORSHIP AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY
That democratic practices do not satisfy the demands of democratic theory is not surprising. What is surprising is that the gap is
insurmountable. Inevitably, we the people are bound by decisions in
which we had no opportunity to participate. Jefferson saw the problem clearly, and responded that constitutions should last no more
than nineteen years—the span of a generation.215 Madison saw immediately that Jefferson’s answer was not just impractical, but also
unresponsive.216 Generations do not all appear at the same moment.

214. Id.
215. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: POLITICAL WRITINGS 593, 596 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball eds., 1999).
216. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 215, at 606, 606. Madison presents several
practical objections to Jefferson’s argument, as well as theoretical objections. Id. at 608. (“[The
only solution lies] in the received doctrine that a tacit assent may be given to established
Constitutions and laws, and that this assent may be inferred, where no positive dissent
appears. It seems less impracticable to remedy, by wise plans of Government, the dangerous
operations of this doctrine, than to find a remedy for the difficulties inseparable from [the
doctrine proposed by Jefferson].”).
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Even under a nineteen-year rule, we would continually be bound by
commitments that we did not make or that we no longer support.
Jefferson’s proposal, nevertheless, raises an important point.
Democratic theory must provide an answer to the skeptic who
encounters a previously enacted law and says, “this law is not
mine.” It is no response to vouch for the integrity of the democratic
procedures that produced the law—the skeptic may view the past
history of this nation as if it were a foreign community. If he is not
bound by the laws of France merely because its procedures are
democratic, why is he bound by old laws here? Nor will it do to point
out that he can participate in the repeal of any law he does not like,
for it is always harder to change the law than to leave it in place.
We could try to answer the skeptic by claiming that democratically
enacted laws are more likely to be just. But even if that doubtful
proposition was true, it seeks to ground the law’s claim on its justice
rather than on its author.217
Ultimately, the skeptic’s challenge is even more severe than first
appearances imply. For the challenge is not containable to previously enacted laws. It can also apply to contemporaneous laws, and
even laws that the skeptic had a hand in creating. Recall the
discussion of McQuiggin above.218 Even if I elected the lawmakers
who passed AEDPA, I can still reject, as alien and unacceptable, the
idea that an innocent person might sit on death row because of
procedural technicalities. Being reminded that I voted in an election
will not palliate my concern that the legislature has acted in a way
that I view as not just wrong, but illegitimate.219 If anything, it
further inflames that concern.
In short, we need a theory of democratic legitimacy that does
not equate democracy with procedure. Democratic legitimacy certainly does require certain procedural constraints. But it also
requires a means of receiving the law as our own. Our answer lies

217. Identification of the temporal quality of democratic constitutionalism has been a
central theme of the “Yale School” of constitutional theory. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1992); PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY (1992); JED
RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME (2001).
218. See supra notes 184-96 and accompanying text.
219. See supra Introduction (providing an example of a faculty member voting in a faculty
decision).
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in self-authorship. To flesh this out, we return to the origins of
modern democratic theory, in the work of Thomas Hobbes.
A. The Hobbesian Paradox: Natural Right and Sovereign Power
The modern era began with a problem of political transition: to
move from monarchical rule to a democratic political order.
England, the United States, and France all confronted revolutionary
struggles and each worked out a different solution to this
problem.220 Apart from the practical problems of revolutionary
destruction of the old order and constitutional construction of the
new, these transitions also presented a problem of fundamental
theory. The political philosopher had to explain how the coercive
application of law to a resisting citizen could be legitimate. And he
had to do so without appealing to sectarian religious belief or to
traditional status relationships.
The earliest answers went in several directions, but all adopted
the same baseline: legal authority must be traced back to a moment
of unanimity in which all agreed to be bound by law. Three different
approaches to the unanimity problem emerged. Hobbes theorized a
social contract to which all must have given consent.221 Individuals
would do so because it was in their self-interest, given the alternative of a state of nature in which life was inevitably “solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish, and short.”222 Kant theorized the content of a moral
order that could be determined by reason alone and therefore had
a practical claim on every rational agent.223 Rousseau, who rejected
the legitimacy of representation, appealed to common moral
220. See generally JACK A. GOLDSTONE, REVOLUTION AND REBELLION IN THE EARLY MODERN
WORLD, at xxii (1991).
221. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1994) (1668).
222. Id. at 76.
223. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Allen W.
Wood ed. & trans., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1785). For Kant, “[o]nly a rational being has the
faculty to act in accordance with ... a will. Since for the derivation of actions from laws reason
is required, the will is nothing other than practical reason.” Id. at 29. “[I]f the will is not in
itself fully in accord with reason (as it actually is with human beings), then the actions which
are objectively recognized as necessary are subjectively contingent.” Id.; see also IMMANUEL
KANT, Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE AND
OTHER WRITINGS ON POLITICS, PEACE, AND HISTORY 67, 67 (Pauline Kleingeld ed., David L.
Colclasuer trans., 2006) [hereinafter KANT, Toward Perpetual Peace] (proposing various
rational means of promoting perpetual international peace).
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intuitions. He argued that the problem was to design institutions
that would allow for the expression of the general will, to which all
of us had access under the right circumstances.224
All of these approaches remain vibrant in contemporary political
theory. Hobbes is attractive to social choice theorists; Kant to socialcontract theorists; and Rousseau to constitutional theorists who
continue to propose institutional reforms adequate to capturing the
general will (referenda, extraordinary conventions, and so forth).
Hobbes is particularly useful, however, if we want to make sense of
democratic self-authorship as the rule of law in American political
life. Not because he gives us a more compelling account of unanimity, but because of the way he fails to solve the problem. For Hobbes,
the problem is unsolvable, leaving an issue for political practice
rather than a theoretical solution.225 This is no less true of our own
democratic order; its foundations are a problem of practice, not of
theory.
Hobbes used two ideas to try to solve the unanimity problem: a
natural right of self-defense and the social covenant that creates the
sovereign. These ideas create an unresolvable tension. Hobbes
understood everyone to have, by nature, a fundamental and
unalienable right of self-preservation: “[t]he right of nature, which
writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath to
use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his
own nature, that is to say, of his own life.”226 The unalienable
character of this natural right is critical: a person can always defend
himself against a threat to his life. This is a source of motivation
that operates everywhere in nature. In man, it operates as a concept
guiding his will. To say that a man has no right to defend himself is
like saying that water has no right to run downhill. Indeed, Hobbes
wrote that on this point necessity and liberty are indistinguishable.227

224. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Of the Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND
OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS 39 (Victor Gourevitch ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press
1997) (1762); see, e.g., id. at 57 (“[T]he general will alone can direct the forces of the State
according to the end of its institution, which is the common good.”).
225. HOBBES, supra note 221.
226. Id. at 79.
227. Id. at 137 (arguing that liberty and necessity are consistent).
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The right of nature operates as the sole principle of behavior in
the state of nature. Before there is a state, there are no borders
restricting the operation of this right. This means that there is no
property, for anyone can seize whatever he believes necessary to
preserve his own life.228 Hobbes followed the limitless quality of this
right to its most extreme point. Not even the body of another poses
a limit on what we can do to preserve ourselves.229 Moreover,
because the right operates as a concept for man, it operates with
respect to perceived as well as actual threats. The subject in the
state of nature responds to his fears of future threats, which are
without bound, for any one can become an enemy.
Hobbes famously argued that we leave the state of nature
through a mutual, reciprocal covenant of each with all.230 The point
of this covenant is to create the sovereign.231 The sovereign is given
“the whole power” of prescribing civil law, of judging controversies
under law, of making war and peace, of creating a government, and
of rewarding and punishing subjects.232 Although Hobbes used the
term “sovereign” to refer to who is given the right to exercise these
state powers,233 the important point is the moment of unanimity
from which the delegation follows. The coming into being of the
sovereign is the coming into being of the state with all the regulatory powers characteristic of modern life.
Hobbes seems clever to solve the unanimity problem by making
the social contract an agreement among citizens, rather than
between the citizens and the sovereign.234 The sovereign is a sort of
third-party beneficiary of the underlying contract. I have agreed
with everyone else to give the sovereign this power; I have not
228. Id. at 89 (“[W]here there is no own, that is, no propriety, there is no injustice; and
where there is no coercive power erected, that is, where there is no commonwealth, there is
no propriety, all men having right to all things.”) (“propriety” is an alternate spelling of
“property”).
229. Id. at 80 (“[I]t followeth that in such a condition [the state of nature] every man has
a right to everything, even to one another’s body.”).
230. Id. at 110.
231. Id. at 110-11.
232. Id. at 114 (“[It] is annexed to the sovereignty the whole power of prescribing the rules
whereby every man may know what goods he may enjoy, and what actions he may do, without
being molested by any of his fellow-subjects.”).
233. Id. at 174.
234. Id.
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agreed with him. Thus, for me to resist the sovereign is to violate
my contract with my fellow citizens. We see a parallel with the
referee in a game. The players agree among themselves to give a
third party, the referee, the power to make calls. They do not enter
an agreement with the referee. As long as they are committed to the
game, they have reason to respect the contract even if they disagree
with the referee’s particular calls. They have reason, because
without the referee, there is no game at all.
Analogizing politics to a game, however, is only roughly appropriate, for the stakes of the game of politics are unlike any other.
Indeed, the stakes are so high that the game is always in danger of
falling into a paradox that arises from the juxtaposition of natural
right and sovereign power. What are the subject’s rights when his
life is threatened by the exercise of sovereign power? The right of
nature is unalienable; it cannot be disavowed or lost even with the
formation of the state. Indeed, it is the very ground of the formation
of the state, the whole point of which is to secure life from the
endless threats of the state of nature.235 Accordingly, when the
sovereign comes after the subject, the subject has a natural right to
resist, even as the sovereign may have a right to punish.236 There is
a word for this recourse to reciprocal violence: war.
The creation of the sovereign may not end the warlike state of
nature at all; it may simply change the direction of the threat to life
and security. Hobbes tells us that war is not just a state of actual
conflict, but extends to any situation in which there is a fear of the
possibility of conflict.237 As long as, and as far as, we imagine a
threat from the other, we will take steps to assure our own defense.
This was exactly the problem of the state of nature, which Hobbes
characterized as a war of all against all. But this, it turns out, is
also the problem of sovereign power. Having given all power to the
sovereign, I have reason to fear that he may use it—against me.
States, particularly in Hobbes’s time, tended toward civil war.

235. Id. at 106-07.
236. See MICHAEL WALZER, OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR, AND CITIZENSHIP
3-24 (1970).
237. HOBBES, supra note 221, at 76 (“War consisteth not in battle only, or to the act of
fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known.”).
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Here, then, is the paradox: created to provide security, the state
itself can become the threat to security. We know this today as the
danger of the “failed state.” Hobbes’s point was more radical, for
even the successful state can appear to any particular subject as a
renewed form of the state of nature. When the executioner shows
up, it does not matter to the victim that he claims the warrant of
sovereign authority. It is still the victim’s head that is on the block.
Hobbes, who is often read as if he offers a theoretical defense of the
absolute power of the sovereign,238 actually cannot resolve the
fundamental problem of state violence. He observed that it is a law
of nature that the prisoner will resist and, similarly, that the soldier
might flee the battle.239 Nature is stronger than convention. I cannot
bind myself to give up my own life under any conditions, for
preserving my own life is the fundamental end that I pursue in all
of my agreements.
This paradox is not just a practical problem of enforcement at the
moment the state demands my life. Rather, there is a fundamental
problem with the theoretical strategy of mutual reciprocal agreement, as long as self-preservation is the engine of agreement.240 This
is the paradox that any interpretation of Hobbes must resolve. Its
resolution lies in rhetoric and persuasion, rather than reason and
logic. That resolution requires that we consider another important
Hobbesian shift in conceptualizing law, the movement from a
paradigm of property to one of authorship.
B. From Property to Authorship as the Foundation of Law
One of the puzzling facts about the American Revolution is how
quickly the colonists adopted the language of slavery to describe
238. See, e.g., Eric S. Wilensky, Comment, A Contractarian Critique of the Theory of AutoLimitation: The Fundamental Law of International Relations, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 2011, 202324 n.74 (2002).
239. HOBBES, supra note 221, at 142 (noting that for those commanded to serve in the
military, “there is allowance to be made for natural timorousness, not only to women ... but
also to men of feminine courage”); id. at 145 (“[I]f a man be held in prison or bonds, or is not
trusted with the liberty of his body, he cannot be understood to be bound by covenant to
subjection, and therefore may, if he can, make his escape by any means whatsoever.”).
240. Kant would eventually displace self-preservation with reason as the foundation of the
moral order. See KANT, Toward Perpetual Peace, supra note 223, at 67.
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their own political position.241 Because many of the revolution’s
leaders owned slaves, we find this rhetorical turn hypocritical. They,
however, did not, because they did not yet understand liberty in its
modern form. They did not see a life as something to be made on the
basis of the subject’s own idea of the good. Role, status, religion, and
community were all important in understanding the self; authenticity was not yet a generally available aspiration. Liberalism had not
yet been invented. Indeed, it was more the result than the cause of
the age of revolution.
Quentin Skinner’s work on liberty before liberalism helps us
understand the colonists’ disconcerting appeal to the idea that Great
Britain treated them as if they were slaves.242 Liberty, he argues,
was understood in contrast to dependence.243 To be dependent upon
another was to lack liberty.244 To be liberated—as a child is at
maturity—is to no longer be dependent.245 One extreme form of
dependence was slavery. Alongside that we can put the familial
dependence of children and wives. The household was a domain of
dependence: all depended upon the head, who was a white, male
property owner.246 In classical thought, the household was understood as a domain of necessity in contrast to that of political
freedom.247 That idea of necessity had become an idea of dependence
by the early modern period.
Skinner portrays a world in which liberty is a function of status,
and status a function of property.248 Some people—slaves—were
actually owned. Lesser relationships of dependence—master and
servant, parent and child, husband and wife, and employer and
worker—were analogous to property claims short of ownership in
241. See, e.g., THOMAS PAINE, Rights of Man, Part II (1792), in POLITICAL WRITINGS 155,
198 (Bruce Kuklick ed., Cambridge Univ. Press rev. ed. 2000) (“[T]here is one general
principle that distinguishes freedom from slavery, which is that all hereditary government
over a people is to them a species of slavery and representative government is freedom.”).
242. QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM 43-46 (1998).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 45-46.
245. Id.
246. See Theodore Hershberg, Free Blacks in Antebellum Philadelphia: A Study of ExSlaves, Freeborn, and Socioeconomic Decline, 5 J. SOC. HIST. 183, 193 (1971).
247. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22-78 (2d ed. 1998); ARISTOTLE,
POLITICS 57-59 (H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1932).
248. See SKINNER, supra note 242, at 39-40.
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fee simple. Dependence signified a relationship in which someone,
a superior, had a legally cognizable interest that could support a
demand.249 To be truly free meant to be free of all such demands,
actual or potential, upon the self.250 Accordingly the only person
wholly free was the sovereign, who stood at the top of the order of
law.251 His sovereignty was marked by a radical claim of ownership:
a king’s property was his kingdom. It was passed through inheritance or marriage. The post-Revolutionary remnant of this idea of
freedom is found in the property requirements that were a condition
of voting: only a person of independent means could exercise his
judgment free of the fears and threats of dependence.252
If dependence is a mark of an absence of liberty, it is not enough
for the sovereign to pass laws that permit freedom of action by
subjects, for the sovereign can always change his mind. Liberty is
undermined by the threat, not just the act. The citizen lacks
freedom to the degree that he has to modulate his behavior in
response to the future possibility of a demand. The example in mind
is the family. No matter how kind the head of household, the wife
and children must anticipate that he might change his behavior.
They must, therefore, always act with an eye to keeping in his favor.
Curing the problem of dependence seems beyond the power of
law, for whoever has the power to make law has the power to make
bad laws. Individuals remain dependent on the goodwill of the
sovereign authority. A monarchy can have only subjects—more or
less happy—not citizens. Nor is the problem cured by simply
expanding the ranks of who exercises sovereign power, even if we
move all the way to a democracy. To give the people the power to
make laws may create the worst sort of dependency: fear of falling
out of favor with the mob. Neither does a property qualification for
citizen participation in governance cure the problem, for property
249. Id. at 42-44.
250. Id. at 45-46.
251. See id. at 55-57.
252. See Richard Briffault, The Contested Right to Vote, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1509-10 (2002)
(reviewing ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000)) (“Property supplied independence; those without
property were presumed to be economically dependent on and subservient to others. As a
result, they would be subject to political manipulation and control by their economic patrons
and social betters.”).
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can always be lost. The economic order is as much one of dependence as the political order, particularly for those who must work.
The revolutionaries came as a matter of practice to the same
position that Hobbes had reached as a matter of theory. The
problem of dependence is solved only if in following the law I am
following a command that I have given to myself. There must be no
gap between self and sovereign. We are back to the unanimity
requirement.
To solve the problem of unanimity, Hobbes revisited an idea of
property, but shifted the point of emphasis from the thing (or
person) owned to ownership.253 Ordinarily, when we think of
ownership, we think of a right to dispose of property by sale,
transfer, or even destruction.254 We might speak of an owner’s
authorization of certain activities on or with respect to his property.
If we think about intellectual property, the distinction between
ownership and authorization tends to disappear: to own this sort of
property is just the right to authorize its use. The more we think of
property from the perspective of authorization, the more we are
likely to think of real property disposition as simply one example of
authorization. We will end up saying things like “property is a
bundle of rights” by which the law specifies exactly what it is that
an owner can authorize.255
In contemporary jargon, we could say that Hobbes located the
origin of the state in intellectual rather than real property. The
critical passage in Leviathan is as follows:
For that which in speaking of goods and possessions is called an
owner ... speaking of actions is called author. And as the right of
possession is called dominion, so the right of doing any action is
AUTHORITY. So that by authority is always understood a right of
doing any act; and done by authority, done by commission of
license from him whose right it is.256
253. See HOBBES, supra note 221, at 101-02.
254. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE. L.J. 781, 794-96
(2005) (discussing the right to destroy as part of the right of ownership).
255. See, e.g., id. at 794 (“That said, the relatively small number of right-to-destroy cases
that have been litigated provide a rich opportunity to illuminate property law's first
principles. The right to destroy property is, after all, often an extreme exercise of some of the
more widely recognized sticks in the bundle of rights.”).
256. HOBBES, supra note 221, at 101-02.
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In essence, Hobbes asked: By whose authority does the sovereign
act? The question arises once we abandon the premise that the
sovereign stands in a legal relationship of ownership to the state
and its citizens. Indeed, Hobbes has turned the question around by
asking how it is that a citizen, who is in no sense to be the property
of the sovereign, is nevertheless bound by the sovereign. His answer
inverted what had been the property relationship. The citizen is
bound because he has authorized the actions of the sovereign.257 The
sovereign in effect is exercising the citizen’s authority.258
This concept is readily accessible to the modern mind. Consider
an agent, perhaps a lawyer, who acts on behalf of a principal. The
principal has authorized the agent to make decisions or enter into
agreements that bind the principal. It is as if the principal had done
the act himself.259 Others are to see those acts as “done” by the
principal, just as the principal holds himself accountable for them.260
A legal order allows us to create this relationship of representation
through authorization for artificial persons as well.261 Thus,
corporate officers act as agents or representatives of the
corporation.262 Their acts, within the limits of their authorization,
are not their own.263 Instead, their acts are the legal responsibility
of the corporation.264 In this way, a fiction becomes capable of taking
acts with real consequences in the world.265 This language may seem
modern, but Hobbes uses precisely these terms of fiction, artificial
persons, and representation.266
In an ongoing political community, most relationships of authorization will be heavily regulated by law. Hobbes told us that
children, fools, and madmen cannot authorize actions, for they do
not have the capacity to “judge the same reasonabl[y].”267 Hobbes
257. See id.
258. This idea, which is quite old, springs up in the recent “fiduciary” theories of public
service. See, e.g., Ethan J. Lieb et al., A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699
(2013); D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671 (2013).
259. See HOBBES, supra note 221, at 101-03.
260. See id.
261. See id. at 102-03.
262. See id.
263. See id. at 102.
264. See id. at 102-03.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 103.
267. Id.
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noted that “[i]nanimate things (as a church, an hospital, a bridge)
... cannot be personated [(represented)] before there be some state
of civil government,” for these relationships are fictions that require
law if they are to be recognized and enforced.268 Yet a state seems to
be just the sort of inanimate thing of which the representation
depends upon a similar fiction. In this case, however, we do not have
civil government to specify the terms of the fiction, for we are
speaking of the origin of that government.
Hobbes linked authorization to representation.269 Just as a lawyer
can represent many individuals, each of whom has authorized him,
so the sovereign acts on the authority extended to him by every
individual citizen.270 They will extend that authority as long as they
see the sovereign as their representative.271 Accordingly, the citizens
remain the authors of the sovereign’s actions, including the
production of law.272 This is, of course, a fiction. There is never any
moment at which persons actually authorize the sovereign to act on
their behalf. There is no need to specify the conditions of an original
position—either real or hypothetical—in which authorization is
extended. The foundation of the state is not a problem of origins at
all. It is rather a problem of persuasion. Citizens must be persuaded
to see the sovereign as exercising their authority. If they do not,
they remain in the state of nature, which means they are effectively
in a state of war with whoever claims to be sovereign.273
Just as a principal can withdraw authorization extended to an
agent, a citizen can withdraw his extension of authority to the
sovereign. Politics becomes a project of persuasion, for the state
must persuade the citizen that the sovereign represents him.274 In
part, persuasion is a matter of procedure, as the citizen excluded
from the vote will not see himself in the law. Hobbes also thought
that if citizens see the sovereign as the executioner coming after
them, they are unlikely to see themselves in that action.275 Sometimes the sovereign-executioner takes the form of enforcement of
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 102-03.
See id. at 104.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See supra notes 225-35.
See HOBBES, supra note 221, at 92-93.
See id. at 104-05.
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criminal law. More often, it appears as the figure of death on the
battlefield. Hobbes failed to foresee the strength of modern nationalism, which has supported mass mobilization and mass violence.
Hobbes’s general point, however, is surely correct: identification
with the sovereign depends upon substance as well as procedure.276
The citizen must be able to see the law as something that he has
authored. He must be given an account that persuades him that this
is indeed something he has done.
Unless citizens are persuaded to see the sovereign as a part of
themselves, the state collapses into the state of nature.277 Accordingly, the government’s first responsibility is to sustain the belief in
self-authorship of the law. That the origins of the state lie in
popular revolution, that the people created a constitution, that they
have defended this constitution through acts of sacrifice, and that
they now author the laws—all of these are elements of the modern
social imagery.278 We often imagine a “causal” narrative of legitimacy that runs from citizen, to sovereign, to law. But this is an
inversion of our actual practices, which begin, not end, in legal texts.
With the help of judges, we move from these texts to a narrative of
their authorship, at the end of which we are to see ourselves as
authors. Democratic legitimacy depends on this movement from text
to authorship. And it is precisely this movement that our practices
of statutory authorship must put on display.
C. The Procedural Turn in Modern Democratic Theory
The Hobbesian idea of self-authorship has played an important
role in theorizing modern, constitutional democracy. Although we
agree with Hobbes that belief in self-authorship is a matter of
substantive interpretation of laws, contemporary political theorists
have moved in a procedural direction. They focus on discourse and
the conditions under which the outcomes of public discourse can—or
276. See id.
277. See supra notes 225-35.
278. See PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP 49-50, 68-70, 74 (1999) (discussing the relation of law and revolution); id. at 1014 (discussing the myth of popular will as the origin of law’s rule); id. at 45-50 (discussing the
community’s perception that it is the source of law); id. at 95-97 (discussing the role of
sacrifice in law). For a fuller treatment of these issues, see PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW:
MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 49-100 (1997).
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should be—accepted by citizens as a product of their own authorship. This is the leading thought in the work of Jürgen Habermas
on law; this idea appears in American First Amendment jurisprudence, particularly in the work of Robert Post.279
Habermas’s work on law applies his more general theory of
discourse ethics to politics.280 By discourse ethics, he refers to a set
of regulative criteria that express the internal norms of validation
of an argument.281 As applied to politics, these norms refer to the
conditions of participation in a public, discursive exchange.282
Unless those conditions are met, the outcome of the exchange
cannot have a valid claim on the whole community.
Most importantly, participants must be free to enter the conversation and free to express whatever they believe to be relevant.283
These are conditions of free speech and free access. Freedom in both
dimensions requires that participants come to their positions on
their own—they must be speaking for themselves. In the modern
constitutional state, this means that there must be a significant
domain of private freedom within which citizens can exercise their
autonomy in forming themselves. Public freedom depends, in this
sense, on private freedom.284 Accordingly, public life has a large
investment in securing the conditions of private life. Of course,
private life is no longer thought of as organized around property, the
earlier idea of independence.285
Private freedom in the modern state is a matter of rights enforced
through law. For the state to meet the conditions of discursive
legitimacy, Habermas argues that the laws that articulate and give
279. See generally infra notes 286-92 and accompanying text.
280. See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 7 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (1992) [hereinafter
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS] (aiming to “reconstruct the normative content of the
system of rights and of the idea of the rule of law from the perspective of discourse theory”).
Habermas’s work in law proceeds from his earlier magnum opus. See generally 1 JÜRGEN
HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF
SOCIETY (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984) (1981); 2 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987) (1981).
281. See HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 280, at 7.
282. See id. at 133-50.
283. Id. at 176-86 (discussing procedures that regulate discourse and bargaining).
284. See id. at 82-131 (elucidating this “paradoxical” and “puzzling connection between
private liberties and civic autonomy”).
285. See Hershberg, supra note 246, at 193.
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effect to these rights must themselves be viewed by citizens as the
product of their own authorship.286 There is no pre-political moment
of law—something like natural law or law received from outside the
community. Rather, the law must be popularly legitimated all the
way down. All law must satisfy the conditions of discursive
validity.287
Whereas Hobbes spoke of the conditions under which the
sovereign will be understood to exercise the citizens’ agency,
Habermas speaks of the formation of public opinion in a modern
state.288 Public opinion is now doing the work of the moment of
unanimity in the formation of the social contract. There must be
equilibrium between public opinion and legislation if a body of law
is to be seen as authored by the citizens. The point is obvious if
expressed in the negative. Legislation that runs against public
opinion cannot be viewed as authored by the citizens. It fails to
express their beliefs. Thus, Habermas offers the following as a
democratic principle of legitimacy: “[O]nly those statutes may claim
legitimacy that can meet with the assent ... of all citizens in a
discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally
constituted.”289 Legitimation, accordingly, is an ongoing project of a
reciprocal relationship between statutory outcomes and citizen
beliefs. It is not exhausted in the voting booth. Even elected
representatives can produce legislation that in itself fails to speak
to our status as authors.
Robert Post puts this same idea of self-authorship at the center
of his theory of the meaning of the First Amendment.290 For Post,
286. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 280, at 126-31. Citizens “achieve
autonomy only by both understanding themselves as, and acting as, authors of the rights they
submit to as addressees.” Id. at 126-27 (“The idea of self-legislation must be realized in the
medium of law itself. Hence the condition under which citizens can judge whether the law
they make is legitimate ... must in turn be legally guaranteed. This end is served by the basic
political rights to participate in processes that form the legislator’s opinion and will.”). “The
citizens themselves become those who deliberate and, acting as a constitutional assembly,
decide how they must fashion the rights that give the discourse principle legal shape as a
principle of democracy.” Id. at 127.
287. See id. at 104-10, 121, 127-31.
288. Id. at 132-93 (discussing extensively the means by which administrative power bound
to communicative power—itself the product of certain specified conditions—serves to
legitimize a political order and the exercise of political power).
289. Id. at 110.
290. See, e.g., Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
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freedom of speech is the source of legitimacy for the legal productions of the state. He picks up on Habermas’s idea of discourse
ethics, asking what are the conditions under which citizens will
believe themselves excluded from the formation of public opinion
that leads to legislation.291 His immediate answer is that a citizen
who is excluded from the public debate, or from speaking freely in
the public debate, cannot believe that his point of view has been
considered.292 Unable to put forth his views, he is denied the
opportunity to try to persuade his fellow citizens. Public opinion is
formed as if he were absent—or worse, as if he did not count.
Thus, for Post, just as for Habermas, the fundamental principle
of the First Amendment is an anti-exclusion norm. Short of some
extraordinary threat to the public safety, everyone must be allowed
to enter the public forum and express whatever views seem
important to them. Exclusion undermines the claim to legitimacy of
whatever state behavior, including legislation, follows.293 The citizen
excluded from participation in the formation of public opinion
stands to his own state’s law as does a foreigner. The law may make
a just claim upon him, but it is not his own. He has no particular
reason to defend it, for his identity is not at issue. Indeed, he has
every reason to view the law through the prism of his own selfinterest, asking how he can turn it to his advantage. In that case,
the idea of a community of citizens engaged with each other in a
mutual project of self-government has already failed. Merely
enacting laws that pass some abstract idea of justice will not suffice
to recover it.

Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2368 (2000) (“[T]he participatory approach views the
function of the First Amendment to be the safeguarding of public discourse from regulations
that are inconsistent with democratic legitimacy. State restrictions on public discourse can
be inconsistent with democratic legitimacy in two distinct ways. To the extent that the state
cuts off particular citizens from participation in public discourse, it pro tanto negates its claim
to democratic legitimacy with respect to such citizens. To the extent that the state regulates
public discourse so as to reflect the values and priorities of some vision of collective identity,
it preempts the very democratic process by which collective identity is to be determined.”).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 2369-74.
293. Dworkin makes a similar point. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 184-210 (2000). But see JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE
SPEECH 5-6 (2012) (arguing that hate speech should be disallowed on the grounds that it
undermines “group” dignity).

2014]

STATUTES AND DEMOCRATIC SELF-AUTHORSHIP

177

Both Habermas and Post tie the idea of a liberal polity to the idea
of self-authorship. Both are deeply inside the shift of legal paradigm
from property to authorship. Property, if allowed to intrude upon
the foundations of the state, can only take the form of coercion,
violence, and threats of violence. To preserve individual freedom
within the law, the laws themselves must be an expression of that
freedom. They must be seen as freely given by the subject to
himself. Thus, the subject must bind himself or herself. For Post
and Habermas, this sets political theory on an inquiry into procedure: what are the conditions under which citizens will see their
political participation as an expression of their free agency?
The answer to this procedural question no doubt constitutes a
necessary criterion of democratic legitimacy, but it is not sufficient.
Neither Habermas nor Post can deal with the intergenerational
problem of the law, the constant reality of being bound by laws in
whose production one had no chance to participate. How am I to see
my own authorial agency in that law? A law does not become mine
simply because I am reminded that the people of a prior generation
produced the law. If anything, that reminder only reinforces my
grievance. More deeply, procedure is no guarantee of substance.
Why else would we have substantive constitutional norms?
In the end, the question is whether we take ownership of law as
acts of collective self-authorship. This requires the management of
substantive belief, not just a demonstration of fair procedures.
Expanding the horizon of consideration from voting alone to the
discursive formation of public opinion is a step in the right direction,
but does not yet reach the goal. The next step is up to the courts,
who must persuade us to see the law as our common project.
CONCLUSION
Academics have gotten into a bad habit of distinguishing
democracy from law. Democracy is about politics, which necessarily
involves passions, interests, and shifting coalitions. Against this
backdrop, law seems to embody the virtues that politics lacks:
objectivity, predictability, and stability. Courts are to bring the
virtues of the rule of law to our otherwise unruly politics. Separating law from politics once seemed a way to secure the judicial role
as the voice of principle that could rationally govern the democratic
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agon. Yet this view of law—as a corrective to politics—led only to
puzzles about the judicial role, from the countermajoritarian
difficulty of constitutional law to the endless debates about “faithful
agency” in statutory construction.
As it turns out, the diagnosis was misguided. Democratic politics
is not bereft of principles; rather, principles are just what we argue
about. Because the diagnosis was wrong, the remedy has been
ineffective. Politics without courts is not lacking in reason. The risk
runs the other way. Courts without politics lack legitimacy. If we
cannot separate politics from principle, we cannot separate courts
from politics. The question is not whether courts can be apolitical,
but what kind of politics the courts must pursue.
In this Article, we answer that question by taking seriously the
way courts facilitate, rather than subvert, the democratic enterprise
of ordinary law. Our answer does not center on principles. It centers
on narratives. A democracy depends on citizens’ beliefs that the rule
of law and the rule of the people coincide. Courts are uniquely
situated to take up that rhetorical task of persuasion. Their role is
not different in kind from that demanded of other public figures and
statesmen in a democracy. They too must persuade us that we are
a people advancing a common project with a past that we recognize
as our own and a future in which our responsibility is to continue
the project.
Some will respond with considerable skepticism, if not fear, to the
idea that there is no truth of the matter that is within reach of the
courts; that opinions are a display of rhetoric not proof; that the only
measure of law’s success is persuasion. There is nothing to fear in
any of this. We have lived for a very long time under just these
conditions. In fact this is all that we have ever known, notwithstanding claims of objectivity, truth, proof, and right answers. Law
is not a science, but a practical project of managing beliefs. Central
among those beliefs is the democratic authorship of the law.
Returning to Hobbes helps us see that authorship of law is a
practice of social accountability, not a fact of draftsmanship. When
we ascribe authorship to the people, we are following the fundamental myth of the democratic state. To call self-authorship a myth is
neither to discount its importance nor to downplay its power. The
myth supports belief in a collective agent—We the People—that
wrote a constitution two hundred years ago, and that continues to
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author its own destiny to this day. The courts’ role is to continue the
project by persuading us to see the law, the Constitution and
statutes alike, as the site of our own freedom. If the courts can no
longer persuade us of this, it is not just their project that will falter,
but the entirety of the democratic project. Without the myth of
democratic self-authorship, we may be governed justly, but we will
not be governing ourselves.

